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Abstract
This Article consists of four parts. Part I sketches the historical background of the Sri Lankan
ethnic conflict and the process of easing ethnic tensions. This overview seeks to introduce the
reader to the principal parties, issues, and developments in the dispute resolution process, as well
as to elicit historical trends that inform current efforts to achieve peace. Part II systematically
presents, through published reports, letters, and joint statements of the parties, and through in-
terviews with negotiators and officials from both the government and the LTTE, the events and
the process of the 1994-95 peace talks. Part II aims to characterize and to identify the diffi-
culties encountered in these talks. Part III explicates and dissects the lessons from the 1994-95
experience. Part III explores in depth how the lack of an operating framework, agent and principal
tensions, modes of communication, procedures within the talks, and efforts to structure implemen-
tation impeded a negotiated settlement. Part IV draws from the lessons learned from the 1994-95
talks and provides six recommendations for the government and the LTTE to overcome the main
process-oriented obstacles that emerged. Finally, the conclusion provides a brief assessment of the
prospects for reviving the peace talks and an appraisal of the most urgent steps needed to repair
the relationship between the government and the LTTE.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 13, 1994, four negotiators from the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka arrived in the rebel-held territory of the Liber-
ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") to begin face-to-face
peace talks with the LTTE. After eleven years of civil war that
left over 34,000 dead, both sides realized that a window of oppor-
tunity for negotiating a peaceful solution to the intractable mili-
tary conflict had emerged.' The mood throughout the island of
Sri Lanka was euphoric. Thousands of ordinary Tamil civilians,
who gathered to witness the arrival of the opposing-government
delegation, streamed through LTTE barricades in an outpour-
ing of support for the peace process, throwing flower petals and
kissing the hands of the government officials.2 The opportunity
for a peaceful resolution of the violent civil war was historic.
Six months later, the LTTE abrogated a cessation of hostili-
ties agreement by attacking a Sri Lankan Navy ship. The govern-
ment of Sri Lanka responded by mounting a major offensive to
recapture all LTTE-held territory. The years since the break-
down of the peace talks have been characterized by intense mili-
tary conflict. The use of sophisticated, heavy weapons, the con-
frontation of large battalions of ground troops, and the resulting
number of deaths among military and civilian populations sug-
gest that the war has now entered into a particularly fierce
1. Sri Lanka and Guerrillas Agree to End Blockade, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 18-19,
1995.
2. Cease-fire Talks for Day Two, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Oct. 15, 1994, at 12.
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stage.' Recently, the LTTE has responded to its loss of territory
by using suicide bombers to attack major Sinhalese cultural and
military sites. The most sacred Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka,
The Temple of the Tooth, was attacked by suicide bombers in
January 1998 to disrupt celebrations of Sri Lanka's fiftieth anni-
versary of independence, just days before the visit of Britain's
Prince Charles. The government has since banned the LTTE,
outlawing all communications with the group. In short, the cur-
rent divide between the two sides has never been so wide, hos-
tile, and destructive.
How did this happen? How did the Sri Lankan government
and the LTTE move so quickly from embracing a historic oppor-
tunity for peace to all-out war? Careful analysis of the 1994-95
Sri Lankan peace talks reveals that a major obstacle in the nego-
tiations was a poorly designed process. Despite the momentous
nature of the talks, and despite the captivation of the country
that the talks inspired, the government and the LTTE failed to
consider systematically-important process issues of the negotia-
tions. In this Article, the process of the 1994-95 peace talks-
how they were conceived, structured, and conducted-will be
dissected in order to identify the process-oriented obstacles that
impeded a negotiated agreement. Once the lessons from the
1994-95 talks are elicited, this inquiry will suggest alternative
processes that might facilitate a negotiated settlement if talks are
held in the future.
Two caveats in this study's approach must be mentioned at
the outset. First, although the substantive issues and competing
positions of the parties will be examined, this author will not be
so bold as to suggest solutions or arrangements to end the hostil-
ities. The difficult and complex military and political arrange-
ments will have to be worked out by the parties themselves. This
inquiry will instead seek to explain how errors in the process of
the peace talks contributed to their breakdown and to provide
recommendations should future talks be held. Second, the ex-
amination of the weaknesses in the process of the peace talks is
not meant to serve as a comprehensive explanation for why the
talks failed. As will be subsequently explained, many factors, of
which the process is only one, can be credibly identified as obsta-
3. Rashna Writer, Sri Lanka Takes the Cautious First Steps Toward Ending the War, DEF.
& FOREIGN Air. STRATEGIC POL'Y, June-Jul. 1996, at 21.
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cles to peace.4 The argument that this Article will put forth is
that the process of the peace talks significantly impeded the ne-
gotiations, and reforms to the process may advance the peace
dialogue. It is likely, however, that other factors must also be
present for peace talks to be successful.
The inquiry into the process of the 1994-95 Sri Lankan
peace talks is important for several reasons. Perhaps most obvi-
ously, it is meant to assist and inform practitioners of peace in
Sri Lanka. One of the central tenets of this Article is that the
peace talks were constructed in such an ad hoc and unprofes-
sional manner that a negotiated solution to the complex conflict
was virtually precluded. Identifying process-oriented obstacles,
and potential paths around these obstacles are vitally important
if future talks are to be successful.
The importance of understanding the mistakes of the 1994-
95 peace talks is heightened by the unlikelihood of a military
resolution to the Sri Lankan conflict. According to Sri Lanka's
most noted military columnist, neither the government nor the
LTTE has been able to secure a lasting victory over the other,
and little has changed militarily to suggest that such a military
solution is possible.5 Although the Sri Lankan Army recently
gained significant territory, there is little reason to believe the
LTTE will not remain a significant military threat, as recent
LTTE bombings in Colombo indicate. As long as a military solu-
tion remains unattainable or unlikely, understanding the mis-
takes and failures of past negotiations will have significant value.
The level of death and destruction in the Sri Lanka conflict
also justifies greater effort in understanding paths to peace. Un-
like the ethno-political conflicts in Bosnia and Northern Ireland,
the dispute in Sri Lanka has escaped sustained international at-
tention from dispute resolution analysts, policy makers, and the
general public. The Sri Lankan government's ability to keep
journalists out of the war-torn areas of the Northern and Eastern
Provinces has helped keep reports of abominable suffering out
of the world news. By analyzing errors of the 1994-95 peace
4. Issues of political will, strategic considerations, and substantive understandings
of the issues all affected the success of these negotiations.
5. Interview with Harry Goonethileke, Sri Lankan Air Vice Marshall, in Colombo,
Sri Lanka (Jan. 21, 1998).
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talks, this Article seeks to add to the effort of ending the violence
in Sri Lanka.
From an academic and research perspective, an analysis of
the process of the 1994-95 peace talks would add significantly to
the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict because such a study
has not been undertaken. There are virtually no published
materials that systematically analyze the process of the 1994-95
peace talks. This lack of analysis is due partly to the relatively
recent conclusion of the talks and partly to the focus of academ-
ics on other, more visible international conflicts. In addition,
exciting constitutional reform in Sri Lanka has attracted a great
amount of attention, perhaps at the expense of examinations
into the failed peace talks. The challenge and importance of
this study is therefore tied to a lack of scholarship on the 1994-95
peace talks.
In a broader context, lessons from the peace process in Sri
Lanka might be useful, if only marginally, to structuring ethno-
political peace talks in other parts of the world. The lessons
from the 1994-95 Sri Lankan peace talks and the recommenda-
tions suggested for reforming the process might inform efforts
to arrive at peaceful settlements in Burundi, Cyprus, Kashmir,
Georgia, Northern Ireland, Sudan or the Middle East.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I sketches the histor-
ical background of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and the pro-
cess of easing ethnic tensions. This overview seeks to introduce
the reader to the principal parties, issues, and developments in
the dispute resolution process, as well as to elicit historical
trends that inform current efforts to achieve peace. Part II sys-
tematically presents, through published reports, letters, and
joint statements of the parties, and through interviews with nego-
tiators and officials from both the government and the LTTE,
the events and the process of the 1994-95 peace talks. Part II
aims to characterize and to identify the difficulties encountered
in these talks. Part III explicates and dissects the lessons from
the 1994-95 experience. Part III explores in depth how the lack
of an operating framework, agent and principal tensions, modes
of communication, procedures within the talks, and efforts to
structure implementation impeded a negotiated settlement.
Part IV draws from the lessons learned from the 1994-95 talks
and provides six recommendations for the government and the
LTTE to overcome the main process-oriented obstacles that
19981
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emerged. Finally, the conclusion provides a brief assessment of
the prospects for reviving the peace talks and an appraisal of the
most urgent steps needed to repair the relationship between the
government and the LTTE.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the 1994-95 peace talks, it is necessary to ex-
amine briefly the historical roots of the conflict. Such an over-
view will not only identify the major issues, positions, and parties
involved, but also offer insights into the undercurrents influenc-
ing past peace efforts that continue to hinder the modern peace
process. Three such undercurrents are: 1) the legacy of deep
mistrust between the parties, even when settlements are reached,
2) the omnipresence of intra-party rivalries leading to the en-
couragement of chauvinist sentiments, and 3) the tendency to
dismiss issues of process in efforts to ease ethnic tensions. The
main goal of Part I is to highlight the major historical develop-
ments that will provide insights into the current deadlock,
thereby familiarizing the reader with the history of the Sri
Lankan ethnic conflict and peace efforts.
A. The Pre-Colonial Period
The Sinhalese, comprising 74% of Sri Lanka's population,
or 13.4 million people, are thought to be of the Aryan race, mi-
grating from Northern India in about 500 BC.6 The Mahavamsa,
a sacred text compiled by Sinhalese Buddhist monks in the sixth
century, provides a mythological account of the settlement of Sri
Lanka in which Vijaya, a northern Indian, inspired by the teach-
ings of Buddha, arrives in Sri Lanka to expel its semi-human in-
habitants. There are also accounts in the Mahavamsa of
Sinhalese leaders, such as Prince Dutthagamani, fighting and de-
feating Tamil rulers in the northern regions of the island. 7
Those who claim a "timeless" dimension both in the historical
struggle between the Sinhalese and Tamil people, and in
Sinhalese dominance, often cite the Mahavamsa as evidence.'
The Tamils, comprising 18% of the current population of
6. S.S. MIsRA, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SECURITY CRISIS IN SRI LANKA 36 (1995).
7. David Little, Sri Lanka: Ethnic and Religious Differences 4 (1997) (unpub-
lished paper) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
8. ALANJ. BULLION, INDIA, SRI LANKA AND THE TAMIL CRISIS 1976-94, at 14 (1995).
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Sri Lanka, or 3.2 million people, are of Dravidian descent and
largely practice the Hindu religion. They airived in Sri Lanka
through successive invasions from Southern India and inhabited
the northern and eastern regions of the island. Tamil national-
ists have claimed a historical dominance of the northern and
eastern regions as a basis for current efforts for self-determina-
tion. The waves of Tamil invasions, coupled with the large Tamil
population in neighboring India, gave the Sinhalese a feeling of
being a minority in a regional context.' Although there is evi-
dence of competitions between the Tamil and Sinhalese people
in the pre-colonial period, it is unclear whether such rivalries
were extensive enough to be considered the beginnings of the
current ethnic divide. Rather, as David Little argues, the pre-
modern period was characterized by diffused social and political
relations, 10 suggesting that the real birth of the current ethnic
conflict lies in modern, post-colonial experiences.
B. The Colonial Petiod
Portuguese traders looking for spices were the first to colo-
nize Sri Lanka. When they landed on the shores of Sri Lanka in
1505 they encountered three major kingdoms: a Hindu king-
dom on the Jaffna peninsula in the northern area, a Sinhalese
kingdom in the lowlands of Kotte, and a separate Sinhalese king-
dom in the highlands of Kandy." The interior Kingdom of
Kandy successfully resisted Portuguese colonization, partly due
to Dutch aid. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the
Dutch were able to control much of the island, although they
never exercised full control over the Kingdom of Kandy. The
British were the first to control the island completely, by defeat-
ing the Kingdom of Kandy in 1815.12 By 1833, the British had
instituted a centralized form of government in the Crown Col-
ony of Ceylon and had created five administrative districts based
on ethnic and geographical considerations. 13 The introduction
9. Id. at 15. More than fifty-five million Tamils currently live in the southern In-
dian province of Tamil Nadu, just twenty-six miles across the Palk Straight from Sri
Lanka.
10. Little, supra note 7, at 4.
11. SUMANTRA BOSE, STATES, NATIONS, SOVEREIGNTY SRI LANKA INDIA AND THE
TAMIL EELAM MOVEMENT 47 (1994).
12. ELIZABETH NISSAN & R.L. STIRRAT, SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND ROOTS OF CONFLICT
27 (Jonathan Spencer ed., 1990).
13. Id. at 29.
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of roads, railroads, and English education offering social mobil-
ity, all served to bring Sinhalese and Tamil communities into
greater contact.14
The British established large tea, coffee, and rubber planta-
tions in the Kandyan highlands and brought Tamils from south-
ern India as laborers. These laborers, the descendants of whom
are known today as "Estate Tamils" to distinguish them from the
Sri Lankan Tamils who preceded the British, settled in the
Sinhalese heartland. The emergence of enclaves of these Tamil-
speaking laborers, drawn largely from lower Hindu castes, cre-
ated tensions with the Sinhalese over land and employment.
The Sri Lankan Tamils, meanwhile, were able to take advantage
of their English education, a result of the many English language
mission schools that had been established in the Tamil areas to
acquire a disproportionate number of jobs in government ser-
vice. 15 The lopsided success of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the co-
lonial civil service and the injection of Estate Tamils into the
Sinhalese heartland sowed seeds of resentment within the
Sinhalese community.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, however,
Tamil and Sinhalese politicians worked together in their strug-
gle against British colonialism. The first Sri Lankan member of
the Legislative Council was a Tamil, as was the first president of
the Ceylon National Congress. 6 By the early 1920s, however,
the Ceylon National Congress had split along ethnic lines, and
by the 1930s, Tamil and Sinhalese politicians were battling over
issues of representation in the new legislature and voting rights
of Estate Tamils. On the eve of independence, Sri Lanka's polit-
ical parties were largely splintered along ethnic lines.
C. Independence
The transfer of power to the independent nation of Ceylon
in 1948 was peaceful, especially compared to the violence sur-
rounding Indian independence." The United National Party
("UNP"), under the Sinhalese leadership of D.S. Senanayake,
won the general election of 1947, securing forty-two of ninety-
14. MisRA, supra note 6, at 38.
15. Id. at 28.
16. BULLION, supra note 8, at 16.
17. Ainslee Embree, Statehood in South Asia, 51 J. INT'L AFF. 1, 18 (1997).
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five seats in Parliament and assuming power in 1948.18 The
Tamil Congress, which won only seven seats, decided to ally itself
with the UNP. When the UNP passed the Indian Citizenship
Acts of 1948 and 1949, which deprived Estate Tamils of citizen-
ship and voting rights in Ceylon, a newly-formed Federal Party
split from the Tamil Congress seeking a self-governing Tamil na-
tion.19 Although ethnic issues were beginning to dominate Cey-
lon politics, historians view the tensions immediately following
independence as "strikingly peaceful and orderly."2 °
Order began to disintegrate in the 1956 general elections,
when S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake, the leader of the opposition Sri
Lanka Freedom Party ("SLFP"), won a landslide victory on a plat-
form to make Sinhala, rather than English, the nation's official
language. 21 "Sinhala Only" became the popular slogan of the
campaign and a call for Sinhalese nationalism. 22 The passage of
the Official Language Act, making Sinhala the new official lan-
guage, had more than symbolic effect; it required that Tamils be
proficient in Sinhala to maintain government jobs. For the
Sinhalese masses, this policy helped negate the perceived Tamil
advantage for popular public sector jobs due to their greater
proficiency in English and helped to reestablish Sinhalese he-
gemony over the Ceylon. Because few Tamils speak Sinhala,
Tamil parties viewed this legislation with great alarm. The Fed-
eral Party demanded equal status for the Tamil language, a fed-
eral constitution, the repeal of discriminatory citizenship laws,
and an immediate halt to the colonization of Tamil areas by
Sinhalese people, threatening direct non-violent action if these
demands were not met within a year.23
D. The Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam Pact
Eleven months later, in July 1957, the SLFP and Federal
18. BULLION, supra note 8, at 17.
19. K.M. DE SILVA, SEPARATIST IDEOLOGY IN SRI LANKA: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 6
(1987).
20. ROBERT N. KEARNEY, COMMUNALISM AND LANGUAGE IN THE POLITICS OF CEYLON
40 (1967).
21. Nihal Jayasinghe, The Sri Lankan Conflict: Is It Really Ethnic?, 13 ITr'LJ. COMP.
& APPLIED CRiM. JUST. 27, 28 (1989).
22. BULLION, supra note 8, at 18.
23. Elizabeth Nissan, Sri Lanka: Negotiations, Agreements, and Statements of Principle of
the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil Parties, INT'L ALERT 1995 (Int'l Alert, London,
UK), Nov. 1994, at 1.
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Party entered into an agreement on the ethnic issues. In the
Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam Pact ("BC Pact"), named for the
leaders of the SLFP and the Federal Party, the parties agreed on
two major issues. 24 First, the Tamil language was to be recog-
nized as a national minority language allowing government work
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be conducted in
Tamil. Bandaranayake had refused to take any steps to abrogate
the popular "Sinhala Only" legislation. Second, Regional Coun-
cils were to be created in the Northern and Eastern Provinces
through direct elections, and Parliament was to delegate to the
councils powers over agriculture, land development, coloniza-
tion, housing, health, and social services.25 No agreement was
reached on citizenship, and nuances in the relationship between
the central government and the Regional Councils, such as
whether the central government could appoint Regional Com-
missioners, were left unclear. The BC Pact, however, was never
implemented. In April 1958, under mounting pressure from
Sinhalese nationalists, including the influential Buddhist clergy,
Bandaranayake abrogated the agreement and abandoned the
proposed legislation. 26 Non-violent protests by Tamils led to Sri
Lanka's first modern anti-Tamil race riots in 1958 in which hun-
dreds were killed.
Bandaranayake was assassinated by a right-wing Sinhalese
Buddhist monk in 1959. This event, in turn, led to a brief UNP
government in March 1960, followed in July 1960 by an SLFP
government led by Bandaranayake's widow. 27 The SLFP won the
election with the support of the Federal Party, to whom the SLFP
pledged to implement the BC Pact. The SLFP won the elections
but once again. failed to implement the BC Pact due to opposi-
tion from Sinhalese nationalists. The Federal Party, unable to
maintain lasting commitments from either the UNP or SLFP,
enumerated four demands before ending its campaign of civil
disobedience: 1) devolution of power to regional councils, 2)
recognition of Tamil as an official language, 3) establishing citi-
24. Peter R. Blood, in SRI LANKA: A COUNTRY STUDY 46 (Russell R. Ross & Andrea
Matles Savada eds., 1990).
25. The Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, Jul. 26, 1957, Sri Lanka Freedom
Party ("SLFP")-Federal Party, reprinted in CHELVADURAI MANOGARAN, ETHNIC CONFLICT
AND RECONCILIATION IN S[I LANKA 187, 189 (1987).
26. Nissan, supra note 23, at 2-3.
27. BULLION, supra note 8, at 21.
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zenship with voting rights to Estate Tamils, and 4) cessation of
colonization of traditional Tamil lands by Sinhalese people.28
E. The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact
A third attempt at easing the ethnic tensions and building a
coalition between Tamil and Sinhalese parties occurred follow-
ing the election of the UNP in 1965. Dudley Senanayake, the
leader of the UNP, made a pact with the Federal Party in ex-
change for its support in creating a coalition government. The
two sides agreed that the Tamil language would be the language
of government administration in the Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces, that District Councils would be created and powers subse-
quently devolved to them, and that colonization schemes in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces would be structured to give
preference to Tamil-speaking people.2" The two sides could not
agree on the citizenship issue. Once again, however, the Sri
Lankan government was unable to deliver on its end of the bar-
gain. Although the UNP was able to pass the Tamil Language
Regulations in March 1966, the laws were never implemented.30
Strong opposition from back-benchers in the UNP coalition pre-
vented the passage of legislation to create the agreed-upon Dis-
trict Councils.31 In response, the Federal Party withdrew its sup-
port from the UNP-led coalition government.
The first two decades of Sri Lankan independence were
characterized by Sinhalese nationalism. The end of British rule
was marked by Buddhist revivalism in which the newly-consoli-
dated Sri Lankan majority aggressively advocated its religious
and historical glory.3 2 The reemergence of Buddhist national-
ism was amplified by the perceived threat that Tamils dispropor-
tionately controlled political and economic powers in the coun-
try and the threat of Tamil hegemony in a regional context.
Moreover, the political system left by the British contained few
protections of minority rights, enabling the Sinhalese super-ma-
jority to easily enact discriminatory legislation. In fact, such dis-
criminatory policies, such as the "Sinhala Only" laws and the
deprivation of citizenship for Estate Tamils, were promulgated
28. Nissan, supra note 23, at 4.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 8.
31. BOSE, supra note 11, at 63, 64.
32. Little, supra note 7, at 4.
1998]
516 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:505
and maintained due to the political competition to capture the
Sinhalese nationalist vote. Although race riots erupted in 1958,
Tamil parties in the 1950s and 1960s confronted the discrimina-
tory policies within the bounds of the political and legal system.
F. The 1970s: TheJantha Vimukti Permuna Uprising and
Constitutional Reforms
The 1970s marked a time of increasing political violence
and ethnic polarization in Sri Lanka. Mrs. Bandaranayake and
the SLFP returned to power in 1970 and within a year faced a
major threat to their government. A Maoist group of Sinhalese
youth, disaffected from the political and economic processes of
the nation, mounted an uprising, comprised of an estimated
10,000 insurgents, and simultaneously attacked seventy-four po-
lice stations. 3 Known as Jantha Vimukti Permuna ('JVP"), this
group of insurgents nearly toppled the SLFP government. The
JVP uprising highlights a thorough willingness on the part of the
government to combat threats to its power with ruthless force.
Death tolls from unofficial sources estimate that more than
6,000 JVP insurgents perished in just a few weeks, while the gov-
ernment itself claimed 14,000 arrests.34 The SLFP instituted a
state of emergency that remained in effect for six years. 5 The
political landscape became colored with violence and a preoccu-
pation for security concerns.
Legal reforms in the 1970s served to increase ethnic polari-
zation. In 1972, the SLFP introduced a new constitution, which
changed the country's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, estab-
lished the country as a republic, and further entrenched
Sinhalese nationalism. 6 The constitution defined Sri Lanka as a
"unitary state" and the devolution of legislative power was forbid-
den.3 7 The state was duty-bound "to protect and foster Bud-
dhism,"" as it was given a "foremost place" in Sri Lanka, essen-
33. See Bryan Pfaffenberger, Ethnic Conflict and Youth Insurgency in Sri Lanka: The
Social Origins of Tamil Separatism, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIE-
TIES 254 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991). "About 90% of the insurgents were under
thirty years of age, while almost three-quarters were under twenty-five." Id.
34. Id.
35. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: SRI
LANKA 3 (Jan. 1995).
36. MANOGARAN, supra note 25, at 56-57.
37. Nissan, supra note 23, at 8 (citing 1972 Sri Lankan Constitution).
38. Id.
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tially making it the national religion. Moreover, Sinhala was en-
shrined in the 1972 Constitution as the official national
language. The SLFP also reformed education policy in such a
way as to gain the support of the Sinhalese heartland at the ex-
pense of Tamil citizens. A new policy of "standardization" in
university admission examinations allowed weighted grading in
favor of Sinhalese students.3 9 Tamil parties, realizing the
marginalization of their communities from the scarce resources
of the state, and witnessing symbolic overtures to the Sinhalese
chauvinist element, formed the Tamil United Front ("TUF") to
protest the discriminatory legislation and to demand regional
autonomy.
While the Tamil leadership presented demands to the SLFP
government, Tamil youths in the Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces were feeling the immediate effects of the discriminatory
policies: unemployment was on the rise and a sharp decline in
admission to universities was underway.4 ° Violent Tamil youth
groups began to emerge in the early 1970s from which a charis-
matic lower-caste man named Velopillai Prabhakaran formed
the LTTE.41 The LTTE's express purpose was to liberate the
Northern and Eastern Provinces from domination by the Sri
Lankan government. Even mainstream Tamil politics were be-
coming more radical. Tamil political parties, responding to
youth frustrations, formed the Tamil United Liberation Front
("TULF"), which called for the union of the Northern and East-
ern Provinces into an independent Tamil Eelam. "Eelam" is the
Tamil word for "Sri Lanka." In the 1977 elections, the TULF
won all the seats in Tamil areas on a platform of indepen-
dence.4 2 The Tamil political scene was divided as to the appro-
priate method for achieving political reform. The TULF advo-
cated peaceful negotiation while the LTTE advocated armed
resistance.43 But the proposition that political separation from
39. Jayasinghe, supra note 21, at 28.
40. MisA, supra note 6, at 52.
41. Id. at 29. The precursor to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") was
a group called the Tamil New Tigers ("TNT"), which Prabhakaran founded. The TNT
is credited with the assassination of the Mayor ofJaffna in 1975, committed, some spec-
ulate, by Prabhakaran himself, marking the first major terrorist act in the Northern
Province.
42. BuRAu OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 35, at 4.
43. It should be noted that in the 1970s and early 1980s, many militant Tamil
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the Sri Lankan government was necessary to protect minority
rights gained widespread acceptance in the Tamil community.
The alarming levels of political violence and ethnic polariza-
tion became increasingly apparent and worrisome to the Sri
Lankan government. Following the 1977 election, the new UNP-
led government, headed by J.R. Jayewardene, introduced a new
constitution purporting to ease the mounting ethnic tension.
The second Republican Constitution of 1978 was created
through a Parliamentary Select Committee, rather than through
an all-party conference, leading the TULF to refuse participa-
tion.44 Nonetheless, the 1978 Constitution did take small steps
to relieve discrimination against the Tamil minority. Freedom of
religion was established, although broad discretionary powers re-
mained with the government. Tamil was defined as a "national
language," rather than "official language," allowing government
administration, including education, in the Northern and East-
ern Provinces to be conducted in Tamil.4" Proportional repre-
sentation was also revised in ways that might have advantaged
Tamil communities. Core discriminatory tenets in the 1972
Constitution, however, were left either unchanged or un-
repudiated. The new constitution still defined Sri Lanka as a
"unitary" state, thereby dismissing possibilities of federation. Ad-
ditionally, it re-codified Sinhala as the only "official" language
and again included the phraseology that Buddhism would oc-
cupy the "foremost" place in Sri Lanka.46 Equally important,
Tamil parties were marginalized from the process of reforming
the constitution. The 1978 Constitution also introduced a De-
Gualle style presidency with wide executive powers, which, SJ.
Tambiah has argued, began the "slide to authoritarianism. '"" At
best, the reforms of the 1978 Constitution were too little and too
late to make an appreciable difference in the growing ethnic
tensions.
Thus, the late 1970s marked the beginning of a retaliatory
escalation in ethnic violence. Reports of attacks on Sinhalese
groups existed. This Article highlights the experiences of the LTTE because they re-
main the only dominant Tamil militant group today.
44. Nissan, supra note 23, at 10 (citing 1978 Sri Lankan Constitution).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. S.J. TAMBIAH, SRI LANKA: ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING OF DEMOC-
RACY 38. 39 (1986).
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policemen by Tamil militants sparked an anti-Tamil race riot in
1977.48 The LTTE responded by intensifying attacks on govern-
ment establishments and government sympathizers in Tamil ar-
eas. The government retaliated violently through its security
forces and drastically through legislation. In 1979, the Sri
Lankan government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
which allowed the army and police to hold prisoners up to eight-
een months without trial.49 Government abuses, in turn, were
met with more violent action from Tamil militants, sparking a
backlash from the Sinhalese community. Thus, the ethnic ten-
sion began to spiral into violence.
The UNP government did make overtures to the TULF to
discuss partial regional autonomy. In 1980, the District Develop-
ment Council Act was passed, which outlined a framework for
greater Tamil governance in their localities. The delegation of
power, however, occurred slowly, just a month before the 1982
presidential election, and the TULF complained of a substantial
lack of resources and influence on local development projects. 0
The perceived failure of a serious commitment by the UNP to
regional autonomy, combined with increased pressure from
Tamil militants in the wake of repressive legislation, led the
TULF to boycott the 1982 presidential elections and referen-
dum, extending the life of the UNP government another six
years. 51 As the political influence of the TULF diminished,
Tamil militants became a more dominant force in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces.
G. The 1983 Race Riots
If there is a spark that ignited the current civil war, it may
well be the 1983 race riots. The events of July 1983 raised the
ethnic conflict to a new level of political violence. On July 23,
1983, the LTTE ambushed and killed thirteen government
soldiers. Reaction in the capital city of Colombo was intense.
Burning and looting of Tamil homes and businesses began in
the areas surrounding Colombo's main cemetery, where the
corpses of the dead soldiers had been brought for burial 2.5  The
48. MANOGARAN, supra note 25, at 13.
49. TAMBLAH, supra note 47, at 18.
50. Nissan, supra note 23, at 13.
51. Blood, supra note 24.
52. TAMBAH, supra note 47, at 15.
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riots were more than a response to the public funeral, however,
for the violence lasted well beyond a day. For the next five days,
a rampage of ethnic violence ensued in the capital and through-
out the country where as many as 2,000 Tamils were massacred
and 200,000 refugees created.53
The role of the government in these race riots also explains
why some scholars view this event as a turning point in the eth-
nic conflict.54 The organization of the mob violence, replete with
the use of buses and voter lists to identify Tamil addresses, sug-
gests planning and some official complicity.55 Tambiah argues
that the breakdown of law and order was not just the result of
marauding Sinhalese civilians, but required the "active participa-
tion or passive encouragement of the ultimate guardians of law
and order-the police and the army. 51 6 Although the govern-
ment blamed the rioting on lawless civilians, the slowness with
which law enforcement responded credibly implicates state inac-
tion.
The aftermath of the riots was multifaceted. One conse-
quence was a rise in the popularity of the LTTE within the Tamil
community. Experts estimate that before the 1983 riots the
LTTE had less than 700 members, whereas after the riots, mem-
bership may have risen to a total of 10,000 members.5 7 The riots
also led to an internationalizing of the ethnic conflict. More
than 100,000 Tamils fled to southern India, while wealthier
Tamils escaped to Europe, Australia, and North America. In-
dia's interest in the region increased when it was faced with the
refugee problem, and world attention was drawn to Sri Lanka's
historic outburst of communal violence. Perhaps the greatest
consequence of the riots was the deepening rift between the
Sinhalese and Tamil leadership and communities. The psycho-
logical effect of the violence, followed by hardening of positions
on both sides, created serious obstacles to constructive dialogue.
After the 1983 riots, the government passed the Sixth Amend-
53. BULLION, supra note 8, at 32.
54. See Marshall R. Singer, Prospects for Conflict Management in the Sri Lankan Ethnic
Crisis, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 259, 285 (Joseph V.
Montville ed., 1991).
55. See TAMBIAH, supra note 47.
56. Id. at 24.
57. Singer, supra note 54, at 263. The Sri Lankan army increased threefold by
1987 from its pre-1983 levels.
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ment, which imposed a ban on anyone advocating separatism.
The effect of the amendment was to obligate TULF representa-
tives to swear an oath against their movement for autonomy.
When all sixteen TULF members of Parliament refused to swear
such a loyalty oath, they were expelled from Parliament. The
declining leverage of the TULF was again met with a growing
role for the Tamil militant groups. The North and East of the
country quickly became war zones between insurgents and secur-
ity forces.
H. The Thimpu Talks
India attempted to broker peace talks between Sinhalese
and Tamil leaders. A summit held in July 1985 between Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President
Jayawardene, led to a commitment from the Sri Lankan govern-
ment to end the current crisis through political means. A month
after this summit, at India's insistence, Indian, Sri Lankan, and
Tamil officials, ten from militant groups including the LTTE
and three from the TULF, met in Thimpu, Bhutan to discuss a
cease-fire and a peaceful solution to the conflict.58 The parties,
however, were unwilling to moderate their positions. The Sri
Lankan government proposed a system of district councils,
which the TULF had previously rejected. The Tamil delegation
advanced four cardinal principles, which, according to the
LTTE's London spokesman, remain the current basis for an ac-
ceptable political solution. These principles are: 1) recognition
of the Tamils as a nation, 2) recognition of the existence of the
Northern and Eastern Provinces as a Tamil homeland, 3) recog-
nition of the right of self-determination, and 4) recognition of
the right of Sri Lankan citizenship and fundamental rights of all
Tamils in the country.59
The government rejected these principles and demanded
renunciation of violence as a precondition to any political settle-
ment and the surrender of arms and the closure of military train-
ing camps in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu as a precondition to
amnesty.6" Tamil parties walked out of the talks and called off
58. Nissan, supra note 23, at 17.
59. BULLION, supra note 8, at 56; Interview with Anton Rajah, LTTE Spokesman, in
London, U.K. (Jan. 9, 1998).
60. Nissan, supra note 23, at 18.
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the cease-fire following a massacre of Tamil civilians by Sri
Lankan forces, leaving some commentators with the impression
that certain factions within the government and army may not
have wanted to see the peace talks succeed.61
Extremists from both sides prevented a negotiated settle-
ment. The LTTE put pressure on TULF officials not to accept
anything less than a fully independent Tamil Eelam. Because
the LTTE was not averse to using force against government sym-
pathizers, this pressure was more than political. On the govern-
ment side, the SLFP was eager to use any concession made by
the UNP as an opportunity to make inroads into the Sinhalese
nationalist vote. Intra-party pressures silenced moderate propos-
als, leaving little room for compromise.
I. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord
The escalation of the civil war in the late 1980s led to direct
Indian military involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict. A 1987
government offensive, coupled with an effective embargo, which
included food and medicine, created a level of Tamil suffering
that the Indian government, with a large Tamil population,
could not ignore. On July 29, 1987, the governments of India
and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord with the pur-
pose of establishing peace in Sri Lanka. The accord called for a
cease-fire, the surrender of arms by militant Tamil groups, the
disbanding of paramilitary government forces, an amnesty to all
prisoners held under emergency regulations, and a commitment
from India to expel all non-Indian Tamils that advocated separa-
tism.6 2 The political solution recognized Sri Lanka as a "unitary"
state but noted that Sri Lankan Tamils have historically inhab-
ited the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Tamil and English
were to have "official language" status, embodied in the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the constitution.63 A system of devolution
of powers to provincial councils was created and India agreed to
underwrite and to guarantee the accord. This agreement in-
61. BULLION, supra note 8, at 56.
62. The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement, Jul. 29, 1987, India-Sri Lanka, reprinted
in DENNIS AUSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA 87 (1994).
63. Tamil parties once again complained that the amendment to the constitution
was drafted and approved without any consultation of the Tamil parties and gave pro-
vincial councils little control over development projects in their areas. Nissan, supra
note 23, at 26-28.
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cluded the deployment of an Indian Peace-Keeping Force
("IPKF") to implement and to maintain the cease-fire in Sri
Lanka. All Tamil parties accepted the provisions of the accord,
but the LTTE withdrew its support in October 1987 following
the arrest and mass suicide of fifteen Tamil Tigers who were
caught smuggling arms.64 The LTTE, not having been allowed
by either India or Sri Lanka to participate in the negotiating pro-
cess because the UNP government still considered the LTTE to
be a terrorist organization, had little stake in the success of the
accord. Indeed, the accord seemed more directly aimed at re-
lieving the ethnic tensions in a way that would provide short-
term gains for the governments of India and Sri Lanka, rather
than bridging long-standing differences between the Tamil and
Sinhalese leaders through the communication of interests and
options. The net result left the LTTE outside the peace process,
thus contributing to its ultimate failure.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was a disaster for both govern-
ments. India found itself in the dangerous position of trying to
enforce the accord on efficient and elusive guerrilla fighters of
the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government faced internal opposi-
tion for allowing a regional hegemon to deploy over 50,000
troops on Sri Lankan soil.65 A rekindled JVP insurrection op-
posed all threats to Sri Lanka's national sovereignty, from both
India and the Tamils, by intimidating supporters of the Accord.
With Indian troops fighting the LTTE, the government was free
to use its security forces to squash the JVP rebellion. The LTTE
may in fact have benefited from the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.
The LTTE was able to solidify its position as the preeminent
Tamil militant organization by mounting 0a campaign of terror
against Tamil militant groups that had surrendered weapons as
part of the accord. The LTTE was also able to disrupt the 1988
provincial council elections through intimidation-Sinhalese
and Muslim66 participation was low--and non-participation.
64. Smi LANKA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at xxxiv. Tamil Tigers carry cya-
nide tablets around their necks and when captured often commit suicide rather than
divulge information. The LTTE claimed that the militants were forced to take the tab-
lets in custody and retaliated by attacking Sinhalese villages. Id.
65. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 35, at 4.
66. About 1.2 million Muslims, or 7% of the population, live in Sri Lanka,
predominantly in the Eastern Province. AUSTIN, supra note 62, at 69. Sri Lankan Mus-
lims have opposed the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a Tamil
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Without LTTE involvement, the provincial council's authority
was questionable. The presidential elections of 1988, won by the
UNP's heir-apparent Ransinghe Premadasa, would mark an-
other change in the government's approach to the LTTE.
J. The Premadasa-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Talks
From April 1989 toJune 1990, Premadasa established direct
negotiations with the LTTE. Both the Sri Lankan government
and the LTTE had come to view the IPKF as a foreign-occupying
army and wanted its withdrawal. Reports have indicated that
Premadasa's government even furnished arms to the LTTE to
help evict the IPKF.67 India was wary of withdrawing its forces in
disgrace, but because of significant losses agreed to remove its
troops from Sri Lanka by the end of 1989. The talks between
Premadasa's government and the LTTE were not formalized
through a series of written agreements and difficult political is-
sues were not broached.68 Instead, a cease-fire was reached
through slight Sri Lankan military concessions, while the LTTE
registered as a political party to contest provincial elections.69
The major political issues were to be discussed after the elec-
tions.70 In June 1990, much to the surprise of the Premadasa
government, the LTTE broke the cease-fire by attacking a police
station in the Eastern Province. After the departure of IPKF, the
common enemy, the government and the LTTE could not sus-
tain their marginal common ground for peace. The UNP gov-
ernment, which had opened itself to considerable attack from
rival Sinhalese parties for making military concessions to the
LTTE, responded with an overwhelming military campaign to
crush the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government, however, was un-
able to win a decisive military victory, and the parties became
embroiled in an intractable civil war. Premadasa, following the
fate of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by
Eelam fearing that they will have less voice in a large Tamil region where their percent-
age of the province will be less. Id.
67. BULLION, supra note 8, at 134 (noting that Premadasa narrowly escaped im-
peachment after this policy became public knowledge).
68. Dayan Jayatilleka, The Premadasa-LTTE Talks: Why They Failed and What Really
Happened, INT'L ALERT (Int'l Alert, London, U.K), forthcoming 1998.
69. Chelvadurai Manogaran, Sri Lankan Dilemma: Negotiated Settlement or Continuing
War, INT'L ALERT (Int'l Alert, London, UK), forthcoming 1998, at 5.
70. Id.
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an LTTE suicide mission in 1993.71
The reasons that the LTTE broke the 1990 cease-fire and
withdrew from the talks with Premadasa remain unclear. Some
believe that the government's delays in trying to repeal the Sixth
Amendment, overtures to rival Tamil militants with links to In-
dia, and demands that the LTTE surrender its arms sparked
LTTE mistrust.7 2 Others figure that Premadasa's peace initiative
caused a "peace trap" whereby the LTTE was deprived of a clear
enemy and, worried about rising war weariness, aborted the
peace process in order to repel potential leadership chal-
lenges.73 Such intra-party concerns are also leveled against
Premadasa, who was precariously forced to concede some re-
gional autonomy to bring the LTTE into the peace process with-
out giving away too much and alienating the Sinhala nationalist
vote. The surprise withdrawal of the LTTE escalated the war,
ended dialogue, and induced a feeling of betrayal that led to
greater distance between the Tamil and Sinhalese leadership
and communities.
K. Historical Trends: Process-Oriented Obstacles to Peace
To understand the process-oriented obstacles of the 1994-95
talks, it is helpful to further explicate their historical roots. Even
this brief survey of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict highlights im-
portant historical trends that inform our understanding of the
talks. The legacy of deep mistrust between Tamil parties and the
government, for instance, grew out of failures within the peace
process and has become a fundamental barrier to negotiations.
The government's inability to implement.the BC Pact and the
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact ("SC Pact") produced acute
suspicion within the Tamil leadership of the government's com-
mitment to honoring its obligations on the ethnic question.
This tension between "agreement in principle" and "agreement
in practice" resurfaces distinctly in the 1994-95 talks. Deep mis-
trust developed through more subtle means as well. Military ac-
tions and the government's inclination to offer what it knew
would be unacceptable to Tamil parties, as the Thimpu Talks
71. Three of the most infamous LTTE assassinations include the March 3, 1991
assassination of the Sri Lankan Deputy of Defense Ranjan Wijeratne, the May 21, 1991
suicide bomber assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, and the May 1, 1993 killing of Premadasa.
72. MANOGARAN, supra note 25.
73. Jayatilleka, supra note 68, at 1-2.
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suggest, led Tamil leaders to interpret the government's actions
as a calculated decision to negotiate in bad faith. Indeed, Tamil
groups consider the government's efforts to ease the ethnic ten-
sions, such as the BC Pact or the 1978 constitutional reforms, as
little more than token attempts to provide a temporary reprieve
in ethnic polarization. The rhetoric and the concern over bad
faith and tokenism remain central to the 1994-95 peace talks.
Finally, the government's approach to the armed conflict, in
which bombing campaigns and an economic embargo create ex-
treme hardships on the Tamil non-combatants, served to raise
the level of mistrust and antipathy between Tamil and Sinhalese
leaders. Efforts to build trust, therefore, are first tied to stop-
ping violent confrontation. As the 1994-95 talks indicate, how-
ever, initially limiting peace talks to cease-fire issues creates dis-
tinct obstacles to long-term peace.
The Sri Lankan government has developed an equally
strong mistrust of the LTTE. After all, the LTTE is the party that
abrogated the recent cease-fires. The LTTE broke the cease-fire
following Thimpu, pulled out of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords,
and ended the talks with Premadasa. The result of such abroga-
tion was suspicion and a seriously harmed dialogue between the
parties. In fact, following the LTTE's abrogation of the talks
with Premadasa, virtually no communication existed between
the government and the LTTE until the beginning of the 1994-
95 talks. Moreover, the LTTE's approach to armed confronta-
tion has been perceived by the Sinhalese public and leadership
as extraordinarily brutal, and, in turn, generates increased ap-
prehension. The LTTE has shown not only a willingness to si-
lence Tamil moderates and to assassinate government officials,
but also to engage in suicide bombings that injure innocent civil-
ians. Any efforts at peace that do not seek to systematically im-
prove the level of trust between the government and the LTTE
have little chance of long-term success, to which the 1994-95
talks unfortunately attest.
A second historical trend in the process-oriented failures to
ease ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka is the pervasive existence of
intra-party rivalries which breed chauvinistic and nationalistic
sentiments. The story of Sri Lanka's modern ethnic conflict is
largely the story of competition between the UNP and the SLFP
to capture the nationalist vote. This competition is not hidden.
Agreements with the Tamil leaders, such as the BC Pact and the
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SC Pact were breached by the Sri Lankan government precisely
to maintain the support of chauvinist back-benchers. More sub-
fly, the rivalry between the UNP and SLFP led the Sinhalese par-
ties to distance themselves from proposed legislation, such as the
1980 District Development Council Act, which sought to devolve
power to Tamil parties. The competition between Sinhalese par-
ties, combined with the lack of protection of minority rights in
Sri Lanka's constitution, heightened ethnic tensions and im-
peded efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully.
On the Tamil side, intra-party rivalries served to silence
moderate voices. The LTIE has been ruthless in its efforts to
elevate itself as the only voice for the Tamil people. The LTTE's
campaign of terror against Tamil militant groups that abided by
the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord is a case in point. Although the
LTTE remains the dominant voice of the Tamil movement and
diaspora today, the remnants of its historical competition with
other Tamil parties remain significant. That is, the LTTE may
feel the need to attain a settlement that is better than a settle-
ment that non-violent Tamil parties might be able to attain, such
as the current Devolution package,"4 in order to justify the
armed resistance, the sufferings of the Tamil people, and the
LTTE's extreme leadership. Intra-Tamil rivalries not only sup-
pressed moderate Tamil voices, but also may have raised the bar
in the 1994-95 talks.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of
this Article, peace and reconciliation efforts largely ignored is-
sues of process. Attempts to amend the constitution in 1978, for
example, were conducted without preparatory discussions on
how to include Tamil leadership in the reform process. Instead,
the constitution was amended without Tamil input. Similarly,
the Thimpu talks lacked a systematic preparatory process, lead-
ing each party to advocate positions that were unsuitable to the
other. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord explicitly excluded Tamils
from the process of peace. Although all Tamil parties accepted
the Accord, the LTTE's stake in the agreement was seriously un-
dermined by the design of the negotiation process in which it
was prohibited from participating. Finally, the Premadasa talks,
which were conducted directly with the LTTE, represented an ad
hoc methodology in which agreements were left unwritten and
74. See Part II.
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the process was never formalized. Without serious consideration
of how to structure peace negotiations, the government and the
LTTE were unable to generate serious commitments to peace.
The failure to think decidedly about the process and notjust the
substance of negotiations continues to plague Sri Lankan peace
efforts.
II. THE 1994-95 PEACE TALKS
Before beginning an analysis of the process-oriented obsta-
cles to the 1994-95 talks, it is important to present the basic facts
and developments of these negotiations. Only after an introduc-
tion to the issues and the process of the 1994-95 talks can one
begin to identify the obstacles to peace and to dissect the lessons
to be learned. Such an introduction is made even more impor-
tant because there is precious little literature on the issues and
process of the 1994-95 peace talks. Much of this modern histori-
cal presentation is derived from interviews and printed sources
available only in Sri Lanka. This section will also briefly present
the developments since the end of the peace talks.
A. The Election and Round One
The People's Alliance ("PA"), led by Chandrika
Kumaratunga, the daughter of former Prime Ministers Mr. and
Mrs. Bandaranayake, came to power through the parliamentary
elections of August 1994 on the promise of peace. The PA cam-
paigned on a platform that called for negotiations with the
LTTE to end the suffering and to create a peace dividend to ease
youth unemployment and to alleviate poverty.7 5 As a sign of
goodwill, the PA government partially lifted the economic block-
ade on the Northern and Eastern Provinces and, during the first
session of Parliament, announced that the government would
seek to resume talks with the LTTE without preconditions. The
government sent a letter to the LTTE through the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") inquiring about begin-
ning peace talks and, by September 1994, had announced a gov-
ernment delegation.76
75. Writer, supra note 3, at 21-22 (stating that projected government expenses for
war with LTTE were US$760 million in 1996.).
76. Sri Lankan Government Waiting for the Rebel's Reply, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept.
27, 1994. The delegation consisted of: Kusumsiri Balapatabendi, the Secretary to Presi-
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The first round of peace talks were held on October 14 and
15, 1994 in an LTTE-controlled area near the northern city of
Jaffna. The government delegation arrived via helicopter and
was greeted by cheering crowds of Tamil civilians and a high-
level LTTE delegation.77 As the two sides had not been in con-
tact for several years, the first round Focused on exchanging
ideas to develop a broad strategy for peace. The chief govern-
ment negotiator explained that his mandate was "very much one
of ascertaining the views of the LTTE and the people of the
North in regard to the shape of the national polity which they
would wish to see. To that extent, we are here to listen to you,
obtain clarification etc. ' 78 No systematic preparatory process for
these historic face-to-face talks existed, and the first round was
largely centered on developing a working relationship between
the two sides.
Without a predetermined agenda, the LTTE suggested that
the peace process should move forward by first creating condi-
tions of normalcy for the people in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces. 79 On the second day, discussions turned to the recon-
struction of roads, hospitals, and power stations, and the open-
ing of supply routes for food and medicine.8 ° The urgency of
basic reconstruction was accepted by the government as a first
step in the process and as a building block to a "speedy establish-
ment of peace."81 Symbolic of the new partnership, the LTTE
unilaterally released eighteen prisoners of war and agreed to re-
sume negotiations within ten days.8 2 The leadership of the
LTTE and government negotiators continue to view round one
of the peace talks as a sincere effort by both sides to consider
dent and leader of the government delegation; Lionel Fernando, the Secretary to the
Ministry of Information; Rajan Asirvadan, a Tamil and former Chairman of the People's
Bank; and Navin Gunaratne, an architect and personal friend of Kumaratunga.
77. Peace Talks Enter Second Day Amid Violence, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 14, 1994.
The LTTE delegation consisted of: Karikalan, the LTTE's deputy political leader;
Ilamperadi, the LTTE's leader of the Jaffna political section; Ravi, the LTTE's leader of
the economic division; and Dominic, the LTTE's head administrator.
78. LTTE Stressed Need for Cease-fire, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Oct. 21, 1994.
79. Interview with Anton Rajah, supra note 59.
80. Interview with Navin Gooneratne, Government Negotiator, in Colombo, Sri
Lanka (Jan. 19, 1998).
81. See LTTE Stressed Need for Cease-fire, supra note 78 (quoting Secretary
Balapatabendi).
82. Peace Talks Enter Second Day Amid Violence, supra note 77.
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alternatives to war.83
The first hindrance in the peace process occurred on Octo-
ber 24, 1994 when the opposition UNP leader and Presidential
candidate Gamini Dissanayake and fifty-three others were mur-
dered by a suicide bomber.84 Although the LTTE denied any
involvement, the Sri Lankan government and international ob-
servers are quite confident that the LTTE was responsible. In
response, the government indefinitely postponed the peace
talks. The UNP nominated Dissanayake's widow, Mrs. Srima Dis-
sanayake, as its presidential candidate and advanced a hard-line
platform calling for the LTTE to renounce its demand for a sep-
arate Eelam as a precondition for negotiations.85 On November
9, 1994, Kumaratunga won an unprecedented 62.7% of the pres-
idential vote and the peace process was reinvigorated by the per-
ceived mandate for peace.86
B. Rounds Two and Three
The second round of the 1994-95 talks, which occurred on
January 3, 1995, focused on creating a cessation of hostilities8 7
between the parties before the impending visit of Pope John
Paul 11.88 The government added both an army and navy officer
to their negotiating team to provide expertise for designing and
implementing a cease-fire, while the LTTE upgraded its delega-
tion with the inclusion of the head of the LTTE political wing,
Thamilchelvan. The parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities
with a fourteen day trial period. 9 The truce went into effect on
83. Interview with Anton Rajah, supra note 59; Interview with Navin Gooneratne,
supra note 80.
84. Chronology of Tamil Separatist Campaign, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 15, 1997.
85. Ravi Velloor, Tigers Must Drop Claims to Separate State: Opposition, THE STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 5, 1994, at 9.
86. THE NEW SRI LANKAN CONSTITUTION (Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.lanka.net/
constitution> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter NEw CON-
STITUTION].
87. In this Article, the terms "cessation of hostilities" and "cease-fire" are used in-
terchangeably; the term "permanent cease-fire" will connote a long-term peaceful ar-
rangement. In the phraseology of the peace talks, the term "cessation of hostilities" was
sometimes used to suggest a more interim arrangement than a "cease-fire," but this use
was certainly not uniform and therefore is not employed in this Article.
88. Amal Jayasinghe, Truce Offers Breakthrough in Sri Lanka Peace Bid, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 7, 1994.
89. Sri Lankan Truce Extended, Military Eases Good Embargo, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Jan. 22, 1995.
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January 8, 1995, the birthday of Kumaratunga's slain father. The
government and the LTTE could not agree on when parallel
talks regarding future political arrangements could begin.9 ° The
LTTE was reluctant to discuss political arrangements until re-
construction had begun in earnest.
Round three commenced on January 14, 1995, and again
was a one-day affair near Jaffna. Issues of implementing the ces-
sation of hostilities dominated the discussions, including the use
of monitoring committees comprised of representatives from the
government and the LTTE and led by international observers.9
Perhaps the most noteworthy accomplishment of the talks was
an agreement by both sides to extend the cessation of hostilities
on an open-ended basis.92 There was again, however, little dia-
logue on substantive political issues. The LTTE refused to dis-
cuss future political arrangements until the government deliv-
ered on its commitment to reconstruct the Northern and East-
ern Provinces. Specifically, the LTTE insisted that the
government open the Pooneryn supply route and withdraw its
Army camp there. The government refused to cede territory
and offered two alternative routes.9" The rhetoric became in-
creasingly polemical.
The major stalemate of the 1994-95 peace talks occurred be-
tween the third round and the final fourth round. In letters be-
tween the leaders, the government accused the LTTE of slowing
down the peace process by avoiding the political dimension of
the talks, and the LTTE accused the government of not deliver-
ing on its commitments to rebuild the North and East.94
Although the government negotiators agreed to ease fishing and
embargo restrictions, the LTTE complained that in practice,
very little had changed since before the negotiations. Press re-
ports indicate that the embargo was lifted on only twelve items
90. Official Statement of the Presidential Secretariat, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Jan. 5,
1995.
91. Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities, Jan. 8, 1995, Sri Lankan Government-
LTrE, reprinted in Text of Govt-LTTE Agreement, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Jan. 9, 1995
(noting that Canada, Holland, and Norway all volunteered representatives for monitor-
ing committees).
92. Sri Lankan Truce Extended, Military Eases Good Embargo, supra note 89.
93. Official Statement of the Presidential Secretariat, supra note 90.
94. See Letters between Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, and V.
Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, reprinted in The End of the Honeymoon, SUNDAY LEADER,
June 2, 1996.
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despite agreement by government negotiators to lift the em-
bargo on twenty.95 The government's public release of the con-
fidential letters between the President and the LTTE leader-to
justify the PA's handling of the negotiations in the face of
mounting public pressure for greater and faster accomplish-
ment-heightened the LTTE's mistrust and suspicion of the
government. The chief LTTE negotiator complained that the
lack of reconstruction "showed the government's mala fide inten-
tions. They are not genuine. '"96
The government recognized the growing divide and sug-
gested that a French diplomat, Francois Michel, a former French
ambassador to Haiti, be employed as a mediator to help break
the deadlock.97 The LTTE rejected the use of a private individ-
ual who would not be acting on behalf of France and one who
was unknown to the LTTE and suspected of having close ties to
Kumaratunga. Rather than jump-starting negotiations, the
unilateral suggestion of a mediator was interpreted by the LTTE
as the government's attempt to advance its standing in world
opinion while refraining from delivering on its commitments.99
The LTTE instituted four demands on the Sri Lankan govern-
ment before reconstruction and further negotiations could be-
gin: 1) dismantle the Sri Lankan Army camp at Pooneryn to en-
sure a safe supply route toJaffna, 2) lift the embargo in practice,
3) transform the cessation of hostilities into a long-term cease-
fire, and 4) establish a joint authority to implement reconstruc-
tion projects. 100
Although the government agreed to move the Pooneryn
Army camp 500 meters from the road,10' the unilateral action of
the government team in announcing the opening of a supply
route that the LTTE had rejected spurred greater mistrust and
95. Sri Lankan Truce Extended, Military Eases Good Embargo, supra note 89.
96. LTTE Deputy Leader on Why "Peace Talks" Failed, SUNDAY LEADER, Jan. 28, 1996.
97. See Dialogue for Peace that Never Was, SUNDAY TIMES (Sri Lanka), May 5, 1996, at
5 (quoting letter from V. Prabhakaran, Leader of LTTE to Chandrika Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka, Mar. 28, 1995).
98. Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Liberation Tigers Not Op-
posed to Foreign Mediation (LTTE Int'l Secretariat, London, U.K.), Mar. 7, 1995 (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
99. Id.
100. Government's Statement on L7TE Responses, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Mar. 7,
1995.
101. Id.
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antagonism.1 0 2 The LTTE insisted that its demands be met
before both monitoring committees could properly function
and face-to-face negotiations could commence." 3 With little ad-
vancement in the peace process, the LTTE issued an ultimatum,
threatening possible withdrawal from the talks if their demands
were not met by March 28, 1995.104 While raising the stakes with
an ultimatum, the LTTE also advanced its greatest concession
ever in the history of the ethnic conflict. Indeed, the LTTE's
chief international spokesman, Lawrence Thilakar, held a press
conference in Paris to announce that the LTTE was willing to
accept a federal arrangement and was ready for political talks. 105
This event was the first time the LTTE distanced itself from its
goal of a full separation from Sri Lanka. Immediately following
the ultimatum, the LTTE released fifteen Sri Lankan policemen
in a sign of faith in the peace process.
C. Round Four and Abrogation
The LTTE did not withdraw from the peace process on
March 28, and instead issued an extension to April 19, 1995.106
The government and the LTTE agreed to hold a fourth round of
peace talks on April 10, 1995, with the proviso that only recon-
struction issues would be discussed. 10 7  The government
changed its negotiation team, replacing Asirwatham and
Gooneratne-two personal friends of the President-with three
leading peace advocates: Dr. Charles Abeyasekera, Dr. Jayadeva
Uyangoda, and Bishop Kenneth Fernando. These three negotia-
tors stayed in Jaffna an extra day to try to revive the peace talks;
102. Letter from V. Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, to Chandrika
Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, Feb. 25, 1995, LTTE International Secretariat Press
Release, Feb. 28, 1995 (stating that "[b]ut to go ahead and make a unilateral declaration
that the government has decided to open the Pooneryn and Elephant Pass routes to the
public can only help to gain propaganda for the government. It cannot be any use in
taking the peace process forward. We are surely disappointed over this .... ").
103. Government's Statement on L7TE Responses, supra note 100. The LTTE also de-
manded that the LTTE cadre be allowed to remain armed when entering government
controlled cities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
104. Dialogue for Peace That Never Was, supra note 97.
105. T. Sabaratnam, President Proposes Early April Political Talks, DAILY NEWS (Sri
Lanka), Mar. 13, 1995.
106. Letter from V. Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, to Chandrika
Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, Apr. 6, 1995, reprinted in The End of the Honeymoon,
supra note 94.
107. Id.
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the other negotiators returned to Colombo after six hours of
talks on April 10. According to the new negotiators, the fourth
round was very much a rescue mission.10 8 The government
agreed to a reconsideration and possible withdrawal from
Pooneryn, as well as to a renewed commitment to ease the fish-
ing ban and embargo.109 On April 12, the government an-
nounced that the embargo was lifted on all but eight items.110 A
fifth round of talks was set for May 5, 1995. Although the talks
appeared to be making progress, Prabhakaran's final letter to
Kumaratunga suggested otherwise. Convinced that the govern-
ment was negotiating in bad faith while consolidating "military
capability of the armed forces under the guise of the current
cessation of hostilities," Prabhakaran explained in his letter that
the LTTE was withdrawing from the peace process. 11 Rather
than wait the agreed upon seventy-two hours before ending the
cease-fire, the LTTE attacked two navy gunboats on April 19,
1995, killing eleven soldiers and seemingly ending the peace
process.112
The attack was viewed with great surprise and alarm by the
Sri Lankan people. The government responded swiftly by imme-
diately reimposing the embargo. It was still unclear, however,
whether the peace process was definitively over. The govern-
ment, perhaps concerned that failed peace talks might affect the
level of development assistance to be determined at a meeting of
the Sri Lankan Aid Group in Paris on April 27-28, 1995, issued
the following statement that the LTTE attack did not end the
peace process: "The government considers this incident to be
only a temporary setback to one stage of the peace process. It is
not a defeat of the peace process undertaken by the govern-
ment.""' 3 At the Sri Lankan Aid Group meeting, Kumaratunga
108. Interview with Charles Abeyasekera, Government Negotiator, in Colombo, Sri
Lanka (Jan. 16, 1998); Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, Government Negotiator
and Chairman of the Sri Lanka Foundation, in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 23, 1998).
109. Interview with Charles Abeyasekera, supra note 108.
110. Letter from Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, to V.
Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTI'E, Apr. 12, 1995, reprinted in The End of the Honeymoon,
supra note 94.
111. Letter from V. Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, to Chandrika
Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, Apr. 18, 1995, reprinted in The End of the Honey-
moon, supra note 94.
112. Rita Sebastian, Sri Lanka: Truce Called Off Civil War Could Enter Third Phase,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 1995.
113. Embargo Re-Imposed, DAILY NEws (Sri Lanka), Apr. 20, 1995, at 1.
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explained that the government was "confident of restarting the
peace negotiation process."' 14  By May 22, 1995, however,
Kumaratunga reversed the government's position by explaining
in a televised speech to the country that the government had the
firepower to defeat the LTTE and was cutting it off from the
peace dialogue." 5 On August 20, 1995, LTTE spokesman Anton
Balasingham revealed that the LTTE would consider peace talks
if three conditions were met: 1) a cease-fire, 2) a peaceful envi-
ronment in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and 3) moves
by the government to ease the urgent economic and social
problems faced by people in the Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces. 116 The government has established its own preconditions
for talks: the LTTE must lay down its arms and must agree to a
fixed time frame for political discussions.1' 7  Unlike the
LTTE," 8 the government fully rejected the idea of third-party
mediation. The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister stated bluntly that
"[t]hird parties coming here is absolutely out of the question.
This is an internal matter."'1 9
With the parties so far apart on the substance and process of
the negotiations, the government acted; it launched a major of-
fensive, Operation Rivirsa, on October 17, 1995, in an effort to
defeat the LTTE once and for all, and by December 2, 1995, the
government had captured Jaffna.' 20 The LTTE responded and
overran an army camp killing 1,200 troopers in the battle of Mul-
lativu. This ordeal led the Sri Lankan government to abandon
its base at Pooneryn because it was deemed indefensible. 121 The
LTTE continued to counter the government's offensive and un-
114. Restoration of Peace Govt's Major Objective, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Apr. 28,
1995, at 1.
115. Sri Lankan President Cuts Tigers from Peace Talks, REu'rTERs WORLD SERVICE, May
22, 1995. The speech was given on National Heroes day and was, interestingly, deliv-
ered in Sinhala and not English.
116. Sri Lankan Tamil Rebels Willing to Resume Talks, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 20,
1995.
117. Chandrika Talks Peace, SR LIKA MONrrOR (The British Refugee Council,
London, U.K.), Nov. 1996, at 1.
118. LTTE International Secretariat Press Release, SUNDAY TIMES (Sri Lanka), May 5,
1996 (stating that "[w] e are of the opinion that third-party mediation is vital to promote
the negotiating process.").
119. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, quoted in Rahul Sharma,
Sri Lanka Rules Out Mediation to End Rebel War, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 20, 1997.
120. Chronology of Tamil Separatist Campaign, supra note 84.
121. Interview with Harry Goonethileke, supra note 5.
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leashed a series of suicide bombings at Colombo's fuel depot,
Central Bank, and financial center. 12 2 The United States placed
the LTTE on its list of foreign terrorist organizations in October
1997.123 This year, the LTTE has struck several times, most nota-
bly by attacking the holiest Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka, the
Temple of the Tooth. This dramatic bombing led the govern-
ment to issue a ban that made it unlawful for government offi-
cials to communicate or to negotiate with the LTTE 1 24
With little prospect for negotiation, the government has
proceeded to ease ethnic tensions by reforming the constitution
in ways that devolve power to localities in the Northern and East-
ern Provinces.125 This devolution package envisages a union of
regions in which regional councils will have meaningful auton-
omy in local government, law enforcement, and cultural mat-
ters. 126 While Tamil political parties have backed the plan, the
LTTE, which has never been privy to the process of developing
the package, has rejected it. The LTTE further claims that the
devolution package is a purposeful attempt by the government
to marginalize the LTTE and, therefore, cannot be considered a
serious attempt to solve the ethnic conflict.127 As of May 1998,
the devolution package remains the only active process to ease
the ethnic tensions, and the LTTE is not a party to this process.
III. THE LESSONS OF THE 1994-1995 PEACE TALKS
Even this brief outline of the 1994-95 peace talks contains a
host of process-oriented obstacles that impeded a negotiated
agreement. Specifically, this section will examine six process-ori-
ented issues that contributed to the breakdown of the talks.
These issues include: 1) the lack of an operating framework for
the talks, 2) the perceived low-ranking status of the government
delegation, 3) the use of letters, 4) the structure of implementa-
122. Writer, supra note 3, at 22.
123. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Oct. 8, 1997).
124. P.S. Suryanarayana, Sri Lanka Row over President's Attitude Towards LTTE, THE
HINDU, Feb. 23, 1998.
125. See SRI LANKA: THE DEVOLUTION DEBATE (Regi Siriwardena ed., 1996); DEVO-
LUTION IN A MULTI ETHNIC SOcIErv (Shelton Wanasinghe ed., 1995).
126. Anthony Davis, Does Peace Have a Chance? Colombo's Political Initiative Loses
Steam, ASIAWEEK, Jul. 5, 1997, at 30.
127. Interview with James Kumar, Spokesman, International Federation of Tamils,
in London, U.K (Jan. 8, 1998).
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tion, 5) the procedures of the peace talks, and 6) the role of the
cease-fire. 128 Taken singularly, each of these issues may not have
had a very significant effect on the breakdown of the talks.
Taken together, however, it is not wholly surprising that the talks
were unsuccessful.
Much of the information in this section comes from inter-
views with LTTE spokesmen, government negotiators, Sri
Lankan politicians, journalists, foreign ambassadors to Sri
Lanka, relief officials, and academics. Because the LTTE is a
guerrilla group and considered by the U.S. and Sri Lankan gov-
ernments to be a terrorist organization, it is virtually impossible
to have direct access to their senior leadership. Currently, the
LTTE leadership is fortified within the Vanni jungle in Sri
Lanka, and the Sri Lankan government does not allow entry into
that region. The result, therefore, of this analysis is a greater
concentration and critique of process-oriented errors committed
by the government. It should be noted that the greater focus of
the Sri Lankan government does not connote its greater level of
responsibility for the failures or obstacles in the peace process.
Rather, because information on government action and
processes is more available, the critique of the government at-
tains slightly greater emphasis. This section will also include,
however, the LTTE's responsibilities in shaping a flawed process.
A. Lack of an Operating Framework
Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the 1994-95 peace
talks was the absence of an operating framework within which
the peace negotiations would take place. A set of general objec-
tives was never agreed upon in advance of the first round of ne-
gotiations, and the 1994-95 talks therefore began with both sides
very unclear about what issues would be addressed and how the
negotiations would be structured. In fact, the government nego-
tiators were given "no mandate," according to one government
negotiator, other than to build a good. rapport with the LTTE
and to begin understanding their positions. 129  Rajan
Asirwatham, another government negotiator, echoed the same
sentiment, explaining that the government was seeking only to
128. A possible seventh issue-the absence of a mediator-will be explored in Part
Iv.
129. Interview with Navin Gooneratne, supra note 80.
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understand the problems and expectations of the LTTE in the
first round of negotiations. 130 The 1994-95 peace talks thus be-
gan in a very unconstrained environment in which both sides
could begin to share their interests and positions.
It is not surprising then that the first round was character-
ized by open and informational exchanges. Since the end of the
Premadasa-LTTE talks, the Sri Lankan government and the
LTTE had not been in direct communication with each other.
Certainly the new PA had no special knowledge of the latest
LTTE positions for arriving at a negotiated settlement. When
Kumaratunga became Prime Minister, advocating a peace plat-
form, neither the government nor the LTTE knew exactly what
peace talks would mean. Also, at the time of the first round of
peace talks, Kumaratunga was the Prime Minister under a UNP
President and was awaiting November's presidential election.
Shared leadership helps explain why the government moved
slowly and carefully at the first round. The idea to begin the
talks in a free and open manner in order to build trust and to
establish common ground seemed a reasonable approach to
both the government and the LTTE at the time.
Without a clear understanding of what would be discussed
or how the negotiations would be structured, the first round
therefore began in an ad hoc manner. For example, the LTTE's
first move was to suggest an effort to curtail the massive Tamil
suffering in the north, followed by a cease-fire. At the time of
the first round of talks, much of the LTTE-held area was without
electricity and phone service, was subjected to indiscriminate
bombing, and was facing serious shortages of medicine, food,
petrol, and most commercial goods.1"1 The LTTE asserted that
undertaking a rehabilitation effort in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces would help to create the conditions for peace and a
sense of partnership in the peace effort. The government, eager
to rebuild the Northern and Eastern Provinces and to win the
support of those populations, agreed that economic develop-
ment would be the initial topic of the negotiation and expressed
the hope that political issues would be discussed simultaneously.
130. Interview with Rajan Asirwatham, Government Negotiator, in Colombo, Sri
Lanka (Jan. 21, 1998).
131. Bombing the Destitute: The Price of War and the Value of Peace, BULL. OF THE NGO
FORUM ON Sn LANKA (NGO Forum on Sri Lanka), Sept. 1994, at 1-2 (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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A mutual understanding, however, of how the rehabilitation is-
sues related to the political issues was never attained.
The LTTE thought of rehabilitation issues as a dire neces-
sity that was the "basic right" of Sri Lankan citizens in the North-
ern and Eastern Provinces. 132 The government, on the other
hand, viewed rehabilitation issues, at least in part, as a bargain-
ing chip. That is, the government expected that as it showed a
willingness to help rebuild the North and the East, the LTTE
would simultaneously begin discussions on a political solution.
Without a clear understanding of the general approach of the
talks, it is easy to see, in hindsight, how such misunderstandings
helped lead to a breakdown in the talks. The government be-
came increasingly suspicious of the LTTE when political issues
were not discussed, and the LTTE became increasingly skeptical
of the government's delivery on rehabilitation issues. Pressure
for political dialogue only exacerbated Tamil resentment. The
government envisioned a political solution at the heart of the
talks, whereas the LTTE seemed to believe that economic issues
and normalization of life in the North and the East were the
primary aims. This incongruence of understandings was never
resolved.
Neither the LTTE nor the government spent much time
simply talking about the peace process. Just as critical, the gov-
ernment and the LTTE failed to talk about talking about the
peace talks. The two sides simply arrived in Jaffna hoping that
some discussion and good faith effort would lead to peace. In
fact, a central criticism levied against the government is that it
structured and conducted the talks with "arrogance and na-
ivet. '"133 One political commentator argues that the "cardinal
assumption" of the government's approach was that overwhelm-
ing pressure on the LTTE and some flexibility by the govern-
ment would result in a peace settlement.."' Malinda Maragoda,
a UNP adviser, blames the breakdown on "sheer inexperience
and incompetence in management."1 35 It seems, however, that
both sides are guilty of failing to develop a mutually understood
132. Interview with Anton Rajah, supra note 59.
133. Interview with Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Pol-
icy Alternatives, in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 15, 1998).
134. Id.
135. Interview with Malinda Moragoda, United National Party ("UNP") Advisor, in
Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 21, 1998).
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framework to the negotiations. The LTTE, which hosted the
talks and set the agenda, bears responsibility for not allotting
enough time to discussing and to detailing the general objectives
of the peace talks and the actual process that the talks would
employ. Usually, such issues are worked out in advance of peace
talks. For instance, in the successful negotiations between Peru
and Ecuador over disputed territory, the U.S. mediator credits
the detailed mandate, painstakingly formulated before the peace
talks, as the basis of the success of the talks.' 3 6 Similarly, negotia-
tors of the 1991 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe credit
the success of the twenty-one-month-long negotiations on the
mandate agreed upon before the negotiations took place."3 7 In
the Sri Lankan context, the development of a general framework
was noticeably, and disastrously, absent.
Indeed, the 1994-95 talks seem more reminiscent of explor-
atory talks than peace talks. Both sides were interested in build-
ing rapport, finding common ground, and determining whether
there was enough consensus to end the civil war. Both sides
seemed sincerely interested in capitalizing on the emotional
high created by the election of the PA on a peace platform. Yet
despite the optimism, there was a failure prior to and during the
peace talks to develop a mutually agreed upon framework out of
which the details and complexities of peace could be negotiated.
The peace talks reflect a visceral and vague effort to achieve
peace, and the 1994-95 peace talks became yet another missed
opportunity in modern Sri Lankan history.
Not only was there a failure to develop a mutually under-
stood framework, but the general objectives that were attempted
seemed doomed to failure from the outset. Despite misunder-
standings in approach, the LTTE and the government first at-
tempted to address economic issues. The success of rehabilita-
tion efforts were, however, essentially dependent on political dia-
logue. Long-term infrastructure investment in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces would have gone a long way in building
trust, but if the two sides cannot reach common ground on a
political solution to the ethnic conflict, such developmental ef-
136. Glen Weidner, Remarks at Harvard University's Weatherhead Director's Sem-
inar: International Negotiation: An Analysis (Feb. 9, 1998).
137. Desmond Bowen, Remarks at Harvard University's Weatherhead Director's
Seminar: International Negotiation: An Analysis (Feb. 9, 1998).
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forts will have little lasting effect. The core issue of any peace
talks-does each side share enough interests so that a negotiated
settlement is preferable to the continuation of war?-were
marginalized in the structure of the 1994-95 peace talks in favor
of incremental, ad hoc economic priorities.
It is interesting to note that even 'when general objectives
were reached, such as rehabilitation efforts in the Northern and
Eastern Provinces, there was a substantial lack of procedural clar-
ity that produced much confusion. For instance, to begin reha-
bilitation efforts, the government created a presidential task
force that outlined priorities and announced the beginning of a
large-scale investment program.138 The government expected
this move to be warmly received by the LTTE as an act of good
faith and commitment to the peace process. The LTTE, how-
ever, viewed this unilateral move as a strategic attempt by the
government to claim most of the credit for the rehabilitation
program, and thus to gain popularity with Tamils at the LTTE's
expense. 139 Indeed, the historical roots of Tamil exclusion from
the process and credit of efforts to ease ethnic tensions is long-
standing. The approach to accomplishing agreed-upon objec-
tives like rehabilitation were not established in the 1994-95 peace
talks, and the parties were left to pursue a course of action in
piecemeal fashion.
Another element missing from the framework of the negoti-
ations was an agenda. According to government negotiator Dr.
Uyangoda, there was no fixed agenda of the 1994-95 talks.'40
Neither side undertook an analysis of potential peaceful arrange-
ments and neither side approached the negotiations with a de-
tailed plan. The date and subjects of each round of negotiations
were typically decided in letters rather than in face-to-face meet-
ings. It was unclear, for instance, when political issues would be
the focus of a round of negotiations. Kumaratunga's letters to
Prabhakaran indicate that the government thought that discus-
sion of political issues would occur at the beginning of the peace
talks, by the second round, and blame the LTTE for stalling and
138. DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Feb. 14, 1995.
139. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Press Release: Why Is Government Dragging Its
Feet over the Peace Process? (LTTE Int'l Secretariat, London, U.K.), Mar.l, 1995 (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
140. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
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being insincere by not setting a date for political discussions.
14 1
The LTTE may have been purposefully stalling, but it also may
have had a different understanding of the timetable of the nego-
tiations. Without an agenda, and without efforts during negotia-
tions to arrive at a coherent agenda, the two sides were free to
conceive competing understandings of when important issues,
such as future political arrangements, would be discussed.
Finally, the absence of an operating framework for the
peace talks reflects a fundamental lack of preparation. The hazy
manner in which the negotiations were conceived and struc-
tured implies that adequate preparation was not undertaken. It
was more than that, however. There seemed to be a conscious
effort not to prepare in-depth for these historic negotiations.
Government negotiators, for instance, did not study past negoti-
ations and were instructed not to speak with former negotiators
in an effort to protect them from skepticism and prejudice.1 4 2
Such purposeful lack of preparation, according to former U.S.
Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Teresita Schaffer, prevented the gov-
ernment negotiators from realizing the importance of conten-
tious issues, such as the problem of the Pooneryn camp, that
arose as sticking points in previous negotiations. 14 3 Government
negotiators received one session of instruction from an interna-
tional non-governmental organization on negotiation tech-
niques, such as body language and ways of responding, and typi-
cally held three meetings per round of negotiation: two short
meetings prior to a round of talks and one meeting after a
round.1 44 There was no Ministry of Negotiation to research posi-
tions and to develop a coherent strategy. In fact, the govern-
ment negotiators had no support staff and, for most of the six
month peace process, had no office.' 45 There was a blatant and
systematic failure to plan for the negotiations and to include
professional negotiators in the process.
141. Letter from Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, to V.
Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, Mar. 6, 1995, reprinted in Govt's Statement on LTTE
Response, supra note 100.
142. Interview with Rajan Asirwatham, supra note 130.
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145. Interview with Charles Abeyasekera, supra note 108.
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B. Agent Issues: Perception and Status of the Government Delegation
Another major process-oriented obstacle was the perception
by the LTTE that the government had sent a low-ranking delega-
tion to the talks. While the LTTE sent a 'delegation comprised of
its deputy political leader, the head of Jaffna political section,
the head of its economic division, and the head of its administra-
tion, 14 6 the LTTE believed the government had sent mere mes-
sengers. Balapatabendi, the head of the government delegation,
was not an elected official but simply an adviser to the President.
His official title was Secretary to the President. Lionel Fernando
was the Secretary of the Ministry of Information, which, to the
LTTE, was not a major position within the government. The fi-
nal two negotiators, Gooneratne and Asirwatham, held no posi-
tion in the government; one was in private practice as an archi-
tect and the other worked as an accountant and was a former
public official as Chairman of the Bank of Ceylon. Circulating
among critics of the government was the joke that Kumaratunga
had sent her architect, accountant, and clerk, and that next she
would send her cook. The LTTE did not view the government
team as representatives of the state, but rather as friends of the
Kumaratunga.147 This perspective created two problems. First,
at a time when each side was gauging the other's commitment to
peace, the LTTE began to form an impression that the govern-
ment was not serious about ending the ethnic conflict.14 Sec-
ond, the LTTE felt rebuffed, believing that there was a pur-
poseful rejection of parity between itself and the government in
the negotiations. G.G. Ponnambalam, an LTTE sympathizer
and General Secretary of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, believes
that the issue of status was so central to the talks that the LTTE
should not have negotiated with the government team until
high-ranking officials were sent. 149 The status of the delegation
146. Peace Talks Enter Second Day Amid Violence, supra note 77.
147. Statement by Political Section of L7E, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Apr. 25, 1995, at
20 (stating that "Mrs. Kumaratunga's hesitation in sending officially accredited repre-
sentatives of the government for these talks, and instead in sending personal emissaries
who have neither political authority nor government status, has itself made the peace
process spurious.").
148. Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Press Release: Text of a
Statement Made by the Political Section of the LTTE in Jaffna (LTTE Int'l Secretariat,
London, UK), Apr. 23, 1995 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
149. Interview with G.G. Ponnambalam, General Secretary, All Ceylon Tamil Con-
gress, in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 23, 1998).
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became a serious psychological obstacle to the peace process.
The LTTE's perception that the government had sent a low-
ranking delegation, however, is not necessarily correct. It is true
that none of the four negotiators was an elected official, but
Balapatapendi, for example, had an influential position as Secre-
tary to the President.150 He was a powerful state official with di-
rect access to the President. Sending an architect and a banker
was not entirely unreasonable either because the first round of
talks was to address a reconstruction and investment package.
Ironically, the government negotiators were chosen because they
were considered to have deep sympathy for the plight of the
Tamil people. Asirwatham is a Tamil and a Tamil speaker.
Gooneratne and Fernando were considered to be pro-Tamil
friends of the President. The composition of the delegation was
meant to reflect a sign of good faith, but was interpreted as a
sign of insincerity.
Perhaps the most salient reason why these four individuals
were chosen as negotiators was their personal loyalty to
Kumaratunga 1 51 In the continuous battle between Sinhalese
parties for the nationalist vote, Kumaratunga wanted to make
sure that errors in the peace process would not later be used
against her to undermine her popularity. Fear of opposition or
competition within the PA led Kumaratunga to exclude all but
the most personally loyal. Also, Kumaratunga lacked political
experience and was therefore unsure whom to trust within her
own government. She inherited a hawkish security council 152
and was aware that peace talks could jeopardize the interests of
powerful officials. There were many profitable hidden econo-
mies of the war, such as arms sales and the trading of banned
goods to the North. In the end, intra-party rivalries prevented
the government from sending a high-ranking delegation with
the consent and approval of opposition parties.
Beyond the psychological obstacles, the status of the delega-
tion affected the actual process of the talks. The government
delegation was not empowered to make important substantive
decisions, but was instructed to return to Colombo after each
150. Telephone Interview with Teresita Schaffer, supra note 143.
151. Id.
152. Interview with Father Mervyn Fernando, Peace Activist, in Colombo, Sri
Lanka (Jan. 23, 1998).
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round to allow the President and her Security Council to make
final decisions. This approach, combined with a lack of plan-
ning on both sides, led Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran to ex-
change letters focusing on the most controversial issues. For in-
stance, discussions of a political arrangement to end the civil war
were never discussed during the peace talks. According to an
insider who has read all of the non-public letters exchanged,
however, political issues were the subject of several letters. 153
The status of the government delegation, therefore, may have
inadvertently helped create a two-tier negotiating system in
which peace talks were held for economic and rehabilitation is-
sues and letters were exchanged to deal with more controversial
issues. A lack of coherence between these two dimensions of
the peace process and a marginalization of face-to-face dialogue
for the most controversial issues were two serious process-ori-
ented impediments that seem to have resulted from the status,
or perceived status, of the government's delegation. Although it
is not wholly unusual for leadership to engage each other on the
most sensitive aspects outside of the official negotiation, the ap-
parent disunity between the talks and the letters may have lim-
ited the ability of the negotiators to arrive at a settlement.
Finally, the status of the delegation may have had an effect
on the implementation of agreements reached in the negotia-
tions. The government did not send top-ranking defense de-
partment officials, but rather only two officers representing the
Army and Navy, Brigadier Siri Peiris and Navy Captain Prasanna
Rajaratna, to advise the government negotiators on the modali-
ties of a cease-fire agreement. Without such high ranking de-
fense department officials, agreements reached in the negotia-
tions were not necessarily accepted by the government's own de-
fense department, but had to be "sold" to them. The most
striking example of the dichotomy between agreements reached
by government negotiators and their enforcement by Sri Lanka's
armed forces is the lifting of the embargo on banned items. De-
spite the fact that government negotiators agreed to lift the em-
bargo on twenty items, the Sri Lankan military only allowed the
free passage of twelve items and only fully implemented the
153. This source requested to remain anonymous.
154. Interview with Charles Abeyasekera, supra note 108.
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agreement after significant political pressure. 55 The govern-
ment negotiators seemed not just powerless to make major deci-
sions, but their credibility and authority to ensure the speedy
implementation of decisions was suspect. While the problem of
implementation will be examined separately, it is important to
note at this point that the LTTE's perception of the low-ranking
status of the government negotiating team, whether accurate or
not, did serve to impede the LTTE's confidence in the negotia-
tion process.
C. The Use of Letters
In the 1994-95 peace talks, Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran
exchanged approximately forty letters. Their correspondence
was meant to jump start stalled talks, to appeal to the opposing
leadership for appropriate action, to make demands, to express
the importance of issues, and to discuss the most controversial
subjects.' 5 6 The use of letters, however, is a difficult way to ex-
press ideas and to explain positions. 157 Developing a common
understanding of approaches and solutions to any ethnic con-
flict is an enormous task. Hours and days of direct negotiations
often fail to produce common understanding. At the very least,
however, parties to a long negotiation can explain, refine, and
revise the technique of communication, including listening, so
that they feel reasonably comfortable that what they say is under-
stood in the way that it was intended. Writing, on the other
hand, forces the author to choose permanently certain words
and styles, leaving greater opportunity for the recipient to attach
a different or competing meaning to those words. When the ob-
jective is explaining one's interests, options, and alternatives, the
use of the written word in place of direct communication is a
more difficult and risky technique. The fact that the letters ex-
changed in the Sri Lankan context were typically short in length
further highlights the dangers of communicating complex ideas
through writing.
The use of letters also impeded the development of trust
between the government and the LTTE by providing each side
155. Sri Lankan Truce Extended, Military Eases Good Embargo, supra note 89.
156. Letters between Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, and V.
Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, reprinted in The End of the Honeymoon, supra note 94.
157. Interview with Neelan Tiruchelvam, Member of Parliament, and Director of
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 20, 1998).
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with written material, or evidence, that could be used by one
party at the expense of the other for public relations purposes.
For instance, despite the fact that the letters exchanged were
confidential, they were often printed in the Sri Lankan newspa-
per or in LTTE publications. When the government felt as
though the LTTE was stalling or spreading false information
about the talks, letters that vindicated the government's stance
would appear in the newspaper. Similarly, the LTTE published
some letters that portrayed its sincerity in the peace process. In
the end, the exposure of the correspondence to the media
served to undermine efforts to build trust between the parties.
Unlike the use of alleged statements during a negotiation, which
could be credibly denied, letters serve as direct evidence of a
position or policy. Moreover, once the first letters were pub-
lished, or perhaps even before that on the suspicion that the
letters might be published, all letters were tainted by the under-
standing that they might be published in the newspapers. The
incentive to draft letters in ways that play to the interest of one's
own constituencyw-with stronger language and a less concilia-
tory tone-soon became apparent. 158 The ability to express in-
terests, options, and alternatives satisfactorily became all the
more difficult. Instead, as expectation began to overshadow the
progress of the talks, letters were drafted and released to pre-
empt and to counter potential public backlashes. In this way,
the letters and the peace process became increasingly polemical.
The use of letters also created a delay in the negotiations
that drained the peace process of urgency and importance.
Communicating by letter took a minimum of four days and
often longer. The ICRC would deliver letters overland between
the LTTE in the north and the government in the south.' The
time for travel, translation, consideration, and response created
a manifest pause in the progress of the peace process. Although
delays associated with exchanging letters can be useful in cool-
ing passions when negotiating dangerous conflicts-as exempli-
fied in the written exchanges between Khruschev and Kennedy
during the Cuban missile crisis-delays in communication
served to create frustration among the parties and the public
158. Letters between Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, and V.
Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTrE, reprinted in The End of the Honeymoon, supra note 94.
159. Interview with Max Hedorn, Country Representative, International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Jan. 15, 1998).
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about the inefficiency of the talks in the Sri Lankan context.
The LTTE's frustrations arose from its understanding of rehabil-
itation issues as urgent and the "right" of the Tamils. 160 The de-
lays in responses were interpreted as indicative of the govern-
ment's lackadaisical attitude toward peace and as suggestive that
the government's primary concern was giving the impression of
sincerity in the peace talks.161 The LTTE may have thought that
the appearance of peace talks would help the government se-
cure a large aid package from the Sri Lankan Aid Group meet-
ing in April in Paris.1 62 The government frequently requested a
"speedy reply" from the LTTE on the issues and conditions that
it set, so that the rehabilitation work could begin and the govern-
ment could show some level of accomplishment to the LTTE
and to both Sinhalese and Tamil voters. While the delays did
not cause the breakdown of the talks, the inability of the leader-
ship to communicate more directly and quickly constrained the
momentum of the peace process.
D. Inside the Talks: The Procedures
As mentioned earlier, neither the LTTE nor the govern-
ment spent a great deal of time discussing the process of the
1994-95 talks. It has been argued in this Article that the failure
to engage in such discussions and analysis impeded the develop-
ment of a common understanding of the specific purpose and
objectives of the talks. The failure to analyze process issues thor-
oughly also resulted in an amateurishly-structured negotiation in
which further obstacles were created.
First among these process issue oversights seems to be the
inadequate length of time in which the parties negotiated. A
typical schedule for a round of negotiations began with the gov-
160. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Why These Double Standards? (LTTE Int'l
Secretariat, London, UK), May 26, 1995 (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (stating that "[tihe very fact that the Chandrika government treats basic
human rights of the Tamil people as 'concessions,' is in itself a throwback to the
Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic approach that the Tamils have been resisting for the past
40 years").
161. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, supra note 139.
162. The Military: A Major Obstacle to Peace, NEWS BULLETIN OF THE TAMIL INFORMA-
TION CENTRE (Tamil Information Centre, Sri Lanka),Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 2; see Chandrika
Talks Peace, supra note 117, at 1 ("Former Finance Minister and UNP MP Ronnie de Mel
says that the government's November peace offers were aimed at the Paris Aid Group
rather than the LTTE.").
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ernment delegation flying by helicopter into the LTTE-held
Jaffna peninsula at around 9:30 A.M. A morning session would
be held from approximately 10 A.M. to 12 P.M., and each side
would convene separately over lunch from 12 P.M. to 2:30 P.M.
The afternoon session would be held from approximately 2:30
P.M. to 5 P.M., and by 5:30 P.M. the government delegation
would be back on its helicopter heading for Colombo.16 To ex-
perienced negotiators, five and one half hours is not considered
a long time to discuss complex issues. 1 6 1 In fact, most peace ne-
gotiations continue for days or weeks. The Camp David Accords,
for instance, were the product of hundreds of hours of negotia-
tions. The process of clarifying issues, building trust, explaining
interests, and discussing options is time consuming. The fact
that much of the morning session of the peace talks was filled
with speeches and party-line rhetoric suggests that even the mere
five hours were not all allotted to learning new insights. 16 5 In
fact, few negotiators with whom the author spoke said that the
negotiations provided them with new understandings of the
other side's interests and positions.1 6 6 In terms of hours and
days, the 1994-95 peace talks were exceedingly short.
It is unclear why the talks were held for such a short length
of time. Some suggest that security issues kept the government
delegation from staying longer, but this argument does not seem
entirely persuasive. On the first round of negotiations, Navin
Gooneratne insisted that the government delegation stay over-
night and that the security was considered appropriate. 167 It is
not entirely clear why staying a week would have changed that
security recommendation. Perhaps because the delegation did
not have decision-making powers, the need to leave the talks and
to report to Colombo was more immediate. Even if this possibil-
ity were the case, however, it still does not seem to necessitate
holding only five hours of talks. After years without communica-
tion, and after decades of increasing mistrust for each other, the
163. Interview with Navin Gooneratne, supra note 80.
164. Telephone Interview with Teresita Schaffer, supra note 143.
165. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
166. One notable exception comes to mind. Asirwatham mentioned that he
gained a greater appreciation for the LTTE's position that the embargo was not greatly
affecting the LTTE, especially after seeing Jaffna and LTTE capabilities, but was almost
exclusively hurting the Tamil people. Interview with Rajan Asirwatham, supra note 130.
167. Interview with Navin Gooneratne, supra note 80.
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LTTE and the government would have a lot of work to do in
repairing their relationship and developing a common under-
standing of the conflict and methods of easing tensions. Indeed,
the LTTE did complain about the government's short stay.168
The proposition that these negotiations were only exploratory
talks and not peace talks is bolstered by the fact that the delega-
tions met for only a few hours on a few days over the course of
the 1994-95 talks.
A second error in the negotiation process was a distinct lack
of an informal dimension to the negotiations. Building trust
and arriving at meaningful exchanges is a difficult task in negoti-
ations, particularly for warring parties. Mediators of ethnic con-
flicts have suggested that informal activities are often essential to
getting negotiators to trust each other and to begin meaningful
exchanges. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Herman Co-
hen has mentioned that the use of informal meetings was instru-
mental in arriving at a breakthrough in negotiations between
Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders. 169 U.S. mediator Glen Weidner
mentioned that significant progress on the negotiations of the
Ecuador-Peru border dispute was made because of informal dis-
cussions between the negotiators at the birthday party of the wife
of a Brazilian General.17 ° Indeed, Allister Sparks, in his book on
the negotiations between the South Africa's National Party and
the African National Congress ("ANC"), suggests that informal
activities, such as a fishing retreat between Roelf Meyer, South
Africa's Deputy Minister for Constitutional Development, and
Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary-General and Chief Negotiator of the
ANC, fostered personal connections between former enemies,
which had a substantial impact on arriving at a negotiated settle-
ment.171 Yet the 1994-95 talks were virtually devoid of informal-
ity or casual gatherings. The two sides did not even have lunch
together until the fourth round, on the suggestion of the three
additional government negotiators. 172 Except for that lunch,
there was no shared meal, jointly attended reception, or system-
168. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
169. Herman Cohen, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Remarks at Harvard University JFK Seminar: Mediating Deadly Conflicts, Sept. 19,
1997.
170. Weidner, supra note 136.
171. ALLiSTER SPARKs, ToMoRRow Is ANOTHER COUNTRY (1995).
172. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
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atic effort to allow the negotiators to get. to know one another on
a personal level.173 Perhaps the only activity of this sort was a
field visit by Asirwatham, who was escorted by the LTTE to see
his aunt who lives in Jaffna. The lack of an informal dimension
to the negotiations therefore became yet another obstacle to the
development of trust and friendship between the negotiators.
The tenor of the talks did not. just exclude informal
processes, but was decidedly too formal. There was a level of
protocol in the talks that had negative repercussions1 74 For ex-
ample, each negotiating team had its national flag on its side of
the table. When pictures of the LTTE delegation negotiating
under its own flag, a symbol of independence to many, hit the
Sri Lankan newspapers, there was an uproar among Sinhalese
nationalists. The government and the LTTE had to react to the
backlash that arose out of this unnecessary formality. Although
the use of flags may have great symbolic value, the practicalities
of arriving at a negotiated settlement necessitated restricting
protocol and formalities that were likely to cause controversy.
This lack of forethought further shows how the structure and
process of the talks were more accidental than the product of a
calculated approach.
Thirdly, both sides failed to engage in brainstorming ses-
sions during the peace talks. The technique of brainstorming in
its most simple form includes exchanges between parties about
possible options and potential arrangements for improving a
current conflict. In an open and non-binding format brain-
storming helps parties identify options that can facilitate effi-
cient trades and create value for both sides. In the Oslo Ac-
cords, the creation of negotiation sessions in which all represent-
atives were encouraged to exchange possibilities in a non-
binding format, is credited with helping to achieve a break-
through in the stalled Middle East Peace Process. 175 The 1994-
1995 Sri Lankan peace talks were devoid of such imaginative ses-
sions. According to Dr. Uyangoda, the great bulk of the negotia-
tions were characterized by traditional hard bargaining, where
173. Interview with Rajan Asirwatham, supra note 130.
174. Telephone Interview with Teresita Schaffer, supra note 143.
175. JANE CORBIN, GAZA FIRST: THE SECRET NORWAY CHANNEL TO THE PEACE BE-
TWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO, 1994; see Amos Elon, Annals of Diplomacy, the Peace Makers,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 20, 1993.
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rhetoric and historical interpretations dominated the talks.1 76 It
is quite possible that the LTTE's inclination to use rhetoric and
long speeches during the negotiations were calculated moves to
avoid substantive exchanges. The failure to suggest and to at-
tempt different approaches and techniques, however, was shared
by both sides. Indeed, the deal-breaking issues of the peace
talks-such as the removal of the Army Camp at Pooneryn-
seem to be exactly the type of issues where creative discussion
and suggestions could have led to mutually beneficial trades.
The failure to engage in such sessions seems to have severely
limited the potential of the peace process.
E. The Structure of Implementation
One of the critical issues in the breakdown of the 1994-95
talks was the implementation of agreements reached in negotia-
tions. Quite simply, the instruments, institutions, and process
necessary to oversee the implementation of agreements were not
effectively created during those meetings. These failures are
most apparent through examination of the economic embargo.
When the LTTE and the government arrived at consensus
regarding the lifting of the embargo for all but eight items, 177
they did not draft a detailed document outlining measurable
guidelines for implementation.1 7 8 Such a guideline is often used
in negotiations to create objective standards for critiquing the
behavior and commitments of the parties. While it has been ar-
gued that written instruments are unsatisfactory ways of explain-
ing interests, options, and alternatives, a precisely drafted docu-
ment is central to providing explicit and exact responsibilities
for each party. Without such measurable guidelines, parties are
more likely to implement their own, perhaps competing, under-
standing of agreements and commitments.
The failure to draft such precise guidelines had a dramatic
effect on the peace talks. The LTTE claimed that the govern-
ment was not implementing its promise to lift the embargo.
176. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
177. Full Text of President's Letter, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Apr. 13, 1995, at 8 ("Only
the following items will now remain on the list of goods prohibited for transport to the
north: arms/ammunition, explosives/pyrotechnics, remote control devices, binoculars,
telescopes, compasses, cloth material resembling army uniforms, penlight batteries. All
other goods can be freely transported to the north.").
178. Telephone Interview with Teresita Schaffer, supra note 143.
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Prabhakaran's letters to Kumaratunga are filled with pleas to the
President to implement the lifting of the embargo that the gov-
ernment negotiators had promised.179 The government admit-
ted that the lifting of the embargo was "hampered by some ob-
stacles," and, in a reply letter to Prabhakaran, suggested that the
government would take greater steps to ensure that the embargo
is lifted in practice.' ° From the LTTE's perspective, the govern-
ment's motives were unclear: it was agreeing to easing the em-
bargo and to creating a favorable public perception of its inter-
est in peace, yet in practice few materials were reaching the
north and east. This perspective was informed by an historical
experience of former Sinhalese governments promising meas-
ures, but failing to deliver in practice.8 " Without specific guide-
lines to point to, neither the LTTE nor the government could
easily or objectively show that they were in compliance.
It is unclear, however, whether the failure of the govern-
ment to ease the embargo in practice was the product of bad
faith. Some commentators have suggested in private that certain
hawkish forces on the government's side may have been secretly
impeding the lifting of the embargo. Clearly, there were sec-
tions of the armed forces whose economic and political interests
were undermined by lifting the embargo and, more generally, by
peace. The embargo created a hidden economy of bribes and
kickbacks to officers and local level officials controlling the
checkpoints. Perhaps more seriously, lucrative arms sales and
the resulting administrative graft were jeopardized by peace ef-
forts. Prabhakaran himself thought the interest of army leaders
in arms sales was the central obstacle to the peace process.18 2 It
is possible that a "third force" was impeding the government's
commitments.18 3 The LTTE, of course, rejects the proposition
179. Letters from V. Prabhakaran, Leader of the LTTE, to Chandrika
Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, Mar. 22, 1995, Apr. 6, 1995, Apr. 18, 1995, re-
printed in The End of the Honeymoon, supra note 94.
180. Full Text of President's Letter, supra note 177.
181. See the Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam Pact and the Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pact.
182. Prabhakaran's Interview, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Dec. 14, 1994 ("Prabhakaran:
I feel the army will stymie peace. They need the war to keep the arms deals going.").
183. Interview of President Kumaratunga by World Service of the BBC, reprinted in
DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Mar. 17, 1995, at 1.
Question: [Nevertheless] you did change the leadership of the military estab-
lishment recently.
Kumaratunga: Just one.
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that the government was unaware of any such efforts. The LTTE
sympathizers point to the Army leader, General Ratwatte, the
President's uncle, and argue that this close connection belies ef-
forts to distance the government from possible irregularities
within the Army's implementation of easing the embargo."i 4
An equally, if not more compelling explanation for the fail-
ure to ease the embargo is simply the administrative difficulties
faced by a developing country informing and institutionalizing a
policy that was to be implemented in regional outposts. Chang-
ing policies and bureaucratic practices simply takes time in Sri
Lanka, and the expectation of immediate responsiveness by
soldiers and officers in the jungle could very well have been un-
realistic. Nonetheless, it is easy to see how the failure to create
measurable guidelines aided the parties in escaping their re-
sponsibilities. The LTTE could vigorously claim that the govern-
ment was negotiating in bad faith and escape the next step of
the negotiations: discussion of a political solution. Likewise, the
government could deny that delays in easing the embargo re-
flected bad faith and could maintain that it was meeting its
agreed-upon commitments. Without detailed guidelines, com-
mitments were simply harder to implement and to measure.
Not only were instruments of implementation lacking, but
also there was a noticeable absence of monitoring institutions.
Although the cessation of hostilities agreement mentioned the
creation of monitoring committees, the process for establishing
these committees remained unclear. 185 When the government
unilaterally invited Canadian, Dutch, and Norwegian monitors,
the LTTE demanded a briefing with all foreign monitors. These
meetings were delayed by poor coordination and, by what some
have suggested, a deliberate stalling by the LTTE. In the end,
the monitors were never able to function effectively. Without
such monitoring committees, the parties were able to avoid ob-
jective critiques of their behavior. This avoidance applies to
Question: Was that not a reflection of the fact that perhaps you were not
getting all the support for the peace process?
Kumaratunga: Yes, perhaps. There were lots of other things. There was cor-
ruption, and lack of - we were not getting full support at certain level.
Id.
184. Interview with James Kumar, supra note 127.
185. See Text of Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities, Government of Sri Lanka
and LTTE, Jan. 8, 1995, reprinted in Text of Govt-LTTE Agreement, DAILY NEWS (Sri
Lanka), Jan. 9, 1995.
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cease-fire arrangements as well as to issues relating to the em-
bargo. Moreover, the attempt to establish monitoring commit-
ments reveals a deeply flawed process that encouraged unilateral
action and resulted in confusion, mistrust, and delays. The es-
tablishment of written guidelines could have helped direct the
creation of monitoring committees. It should be noted that es-
tablishing guidelines and committees would not have ensured
compliance or advanced the peace process: the LTTE or the
government may purposefully ignore its commitments even with
guidelines and monitoring mechanisms in place. The point is
simply that such action is harder to sustain when there are in-
struments and institutions that can be used objectively to cri-
tique a party's behavior.
The government and the LTTE did not develop dispute res-
olution techniques for solving problems that arose within the ne-
gotiations. That is, there was no effort made during the negotia-
tions to discuss how the parties would handle stumbling blocks
and disagreements that arose in the talks. The ad hoc procedure
became an exchange of letters between the leaders, but, as ex-
plained, this exchange was neither efficient nor purposeful. The
development of variable techniques and options for overcoming
impasses in the dialogue, such as holding direct meetings or
phone calls between the leaders, secret negotiations, or a hiatus
in negotiations, could have helped preserve the peace process
during difficult times. Professional negotiators often create such
internal mechanisms, yet none were devised or in place during
the Sri Lankan peace talks. When the parties reached a stale-
mate after the third round of talks, the LTTE issued an ultima-
tum threatening withdrawal from the talks and a resumption of
hostilities in the absence of certain government action. The fail-
ure to develop internal dispute resolution mechanisms danger-
ously raised the stakes when negotiations came to an impasse.
A final flaw in the structure of implementation was a lack of
adequate trust-building steps. Trust-building steps are easily im-
plementable agreements that are designed to demonstrate com-
mitment to the process and to help develop a common stake in
the negotiations. At the start of the talks, the government and
the LTTE released political prisoners to show their good faith in
the negotiating process. Aside from these initial actions, how-
ever, there were surprisingly few steps taken to build trust. The
LTTE did release two captured policemen that had been en-
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gaged in a hunger strike, but only after significant urging from a
non-governmental envoy that met with LTTE leaders in March
1995.86 The creation of confidence building exchanges simply
was not systematically pursued in the Sri Lankan peace talks.' 87
Moreover, the negotiation's approach of beginning eco-
nomic reconstruction before discussing a political arrangement,
left the LTTE with few responsibilities in which it could show its
commitment to the peace process. Other than maintaining the
cease-fire agreement, the LTTE could not demonstrate to the
public any ostensible responsibilities that it could prove it was
fulfilling. The LTTE's complaints regarding the government's
performance were viewed by many as strategic rather than sin-
cere, precisely because the LTTE had so few pro-active commit-
ments that it needed to perform. The creation of more easily
implementable commitments for the LTTE could have elevated
their parity in the negotiation and eased harmful perceptions
that the government was making all the important concessions
during the peace talks.
F. The Role of the Cease-Fire
One of the great accomplishments of the 1994-95 peace
talks was the establishment of a cessation of hostilities to the war.
The decision to refrain from armed conflict during the negotia-
tion was a rational attempt to ease the bitterness and devastation
that accompanies war. To arrive at reconstruction and to build a
common commitment to peace, both the government and the
LTTE reasonably concluded that the bombings, battles, and am-
bushes must first be stopped. The negotiations therefore cen-
tered largely around creating a cease-fire, with rounds two and
three concentrating almost exclusively on the modalities of tem-
porarily ending the war. The cease-fire was largely effective,' 88
holding for several months, and negotiations took place free
from armed confrontation.
The cease-fire agreement, however, created enormous pres-
sures on the negotiations. When negotiations stalled or difficul-
186. DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Mar. 18, 1995. The policemen were released at the
urging of Bishop Kenneth Fernando and Dr. Uyangoda.
187. Interview with Neelan Tiruchelvam, supra note 157.
188. DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka),Jan. 14, 1995 (quoting General Ratwatte, "what im-
pressed us is that the LTTE seems to be making a sincere effort to make the cessation of
hostilities a success.").
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ties arose, the most readily available avenue for influencing the
pace and direction of the negotiations was threats to break the
cease-fire. The LTTE used this tactic twice, and a final time ful-
filling its threat by attacking a Sri Lankan Navy ship and ending
the peace process. Once a cease-fire is created, the temptation
and ability to commit an act that will break, and likely end, the
peace process is much greater. The 1994-95 peace talks took
place under the shadow of such a quick, lasting exit. It is for this
reason that mediators of ethnic conflicts often structure negotia-
tions so that the cease-fire is the final rather than initial step. In
the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, for instance, dis-
cussions of a cease-fire were only seriously entertained after
achieving broad agreement on political issues."8 9 U.S. diplomats
mediating a resolution to that conflict felt that the pressures of
an early cease-fire, in the absence of a general accord on polit-
ical arrangements, would impede a lasting resolution to the con-
flict. The fact that there was no common understanding of the
central issue of the Sri Lankan conflict--the future political ar-
rangement of Sri Lanka-meant that the negotiations were go-
ing to take a long time and the cease-fire needed to hold. In
their efforts to achieve a cease-fire, neither side seemed aware of,
or concerned about, the time pressures that the cease-fire would
create.
In the Sri Lankan context, the pressures of the cease-fire
were amplified by the strain that the LTTE faced in maintaining
unity and enthusiasm during the cease-fire period. Unlike the
Sri Lankan Army, which during such a cessation can retreat to its
barracks and remain indefinitely in a state of preparedness and
organization, the LTTE as a separatist guerrilla organization may
have feared a breakdown in its readiness and fissures in its com-
mand structure. 190 The revolutionary zeal and coordination
needed to sustain jungle fighters in remote areas are challenged
when a cease-fire takes effect. Yet the negotiation process was
not designed to bring a speedy end to the conflict. Ultimately,
the pressures of the cease-fire seem to have contributed to the
withdrawal of the LTTE from the peace, talks.
189. Cohen, supra note 169.
190. Interview with Tristram Bartlett, Sri Lanka Programme Director, Interna-
tional Alert, in London, U.K. (Jan. 9, 1998).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The lessons extracted from the process of the 1994-95 peace
talks imply needed reforms for productive dialogue in the fu-
ture. In this section, six recommendations are presented for re-
vising the process of the talks. The suggestions are directed to-
ward practitioners of peace in Sri Lanka.
A. Employ Third-Party Mediation
Even in this brief presentation of obstacles in the process of
the 1994-95 Sri Lankan peace talks, the deep mistrust and mis-
communication between the government and the LTTE is ap-
parent. Both sides have a history of such increasing polarization
that even attempts to build rapport were misconstrued or under-
stood in vastly different contexts. The status of the government's
delegation is a prime example. As described earlier, the govern-
ment's decision to name a pro-Tamil delegation was interpreted
by the LTTE as a purposeful affront and rejection of parity be-
cause none of the negotiators had high official standing in the
new government. After years of bitter conflict and rare and brief
dialogue, the parties were unfamiliar and inexperienced in the
process of communication in such a setting.
Mediators facilitate communication by assisting each side in
framing and presenting their interests and positions, as well as
receiving and interpreting messages. Successful negotiated set-
tlements in ethno-political conflicts have been influenced decid-
edly by employing professional mediators. 191 In the Sri Lankan
context, a mediator could have impacted two features of the ne-
gotiation.
First, a mediator could have helped prevent harmful unilat-
eral action. In the Sri Lankan peace talks, both sides took unilat-
eral steps rather than joint action to advance the dialogue. In
virtually every instance, however, such action, even if employed
in good faith, had damaging ramifications. For instance, the
government's action to announce a large scale reconstruction
program for the Northern and Eastern Provinces was not warmly
received by the LTTE, as the government expected.192 Rather,
the LTTE viewed this unilateral action as a strategic move by the
191. Examples include the Philippines, Eritrea, Georgia, South Africa, Afghani-
stan, and Israel/Palestine.
192. DAiLY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Feb. 14, 1995.
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government to marginalize the LTTE from the popular invest-
ment program. 193 The LTTE demanded that ajoint commission
be created so that policies and credit could be shared. The re-
sult was a delayed and ineffective reconstruction program that
failed to please both sides. Although a mediator might not solve
underlying tensions between, for example, the level of capital
invested and the amount of credit received, a mediator can help
the parties recognize conflicts that are not readily apparent to
the parties because they are separated by such psychological, his-
torical, and even geographical distance.
Similarly, a mediator can help the parties recognize zones of
agreement. Perhaps the greatest concession by the LTTE in the
1994-95 peace talks was its change in position from a total com-
mitment to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam to the
acceptance of a potential federal arrangement.1 94 This conces-
sion was major. Rarely do separatist guerrilla organizations ac-
cept possibilities less than full independence. This refusal par-
tially explains why twentieth-century civil wars tend to last for
many years, or even decades. Yet the significance of such a con-
cession was not fully understood by the government and Sri
Lankan people. The reflections of negotiators, journalists, and
academics do not seem to appreciate the magnitude of this de-
velopment. A mediator, by aiding the parties in communicating
the difficulties and importance of such a concession, can help
both sides identify and appreciatejoint gains and common inter-
ests more effectively.
After the third round, both the government and the LTTE
recognized that the progress of the talks was adversely affected
by internal miscommunications. The government, in fact, sug-
gested that a mediator be brought into the peace process. Ironi-
cally, the process of this suggestion underlines the fundamental
difficulties that the parties experienced in the absence of a medi-
ator. That is, the government, in a letter to Prabhakaran, and
through public statements, suggested the use of an intermediary
and, after private discussions with the French government, advo-
cated that former French Ambassador to Haiti, Francois Michel,
193. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, supra note 139.
194. T. Sabaratnam, President Proposes Early April Political Talks, DAILY NEws (Sri
Lanka), Mar. 13, 1995, at 1.
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be named as mediator.195 The LTTE rejected the intermediary
as a friend of the government, and perhaps more importantly,
voiced opposition to a negotiation process where the considera-
tion of a mediator was conducted unilaterally. 9 6 The negotia-
tions were so disconnected that even the consideration of a me-
diator was itself subject to harmful unilateral action.
As previously noted, the LTTE is also guilty of unilaterally
injurious action. One example is its ultimatum demanding cer-
tain action on penalty of a resumption of hostilities. While a
mediator may not be able to insist that parties continue to nego-
tiate, a mediator can help the parties better understand the con-
sequences and the gravity of their actions. By encouraging coop-
eration and by assisting the parties in shaping their positions as
warnings rather than as threats, a mediator can help prevent the
parties from inadvertently locking themselves into untenable po-
sitions.
A second important role for a mediator in the Sri Lankan
context would be in assisting the implementation of agreements.
A mediator can impact three dimensions of implementation.
First, a mediator can draft the actual agreements that the parties
reached during the negotiations. As stated earlier, one of the
barriers to implementation in the 1995-95 peace talks was the
absence of written, measurable guidelines, especially in regard
to the lifting of the embargo. A mediator can not only help the
parties realize the importance of such guidelines, but also would
be uniquely positioned to do the drafting. Such assistance could
provide greater objective criteria for judging and critiquing the
behavior and commitments of the parties.
A mediator could also be instrumental in developing and
overseeing monitoring institutions. Efforts to establish monitor-
ing committees in the 1994-95 talks were hampered by an un-
clear process and poor coordination. These committees, in the
end, could not function effectively, leaving each side to wage
public relations campaigns against the other for violating the
peace process. One of the principal advantages of employing a
mediator is to include an objective party to monitor the actions
195. Dialogue for Peace that Never Was, supra note 97, at 5; Letter from V.
Prabhakaran, Leader, LTTE, to Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka, re-
printed in DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Mar. 7, 1995, at 19.
196. Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, supra note 98.
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of the parties and to speak out against violations. A mediator
can help to develop an expansive framework for ensuring the
parties' commitments. For instance, despite the attempt to cre-
ate monitoring committees for the cease-fire, there was little ef-
fort to develop independent monitoring of the embargo. Un-
dertaking such an enterprise might not be exceedingly difficult.
A few observers at relevant checkpoints could have helped the
parties to identify problems and to discourage violations. More-
over, the use of an objective and independent party to discover
and to relay such information can mitigate the bitterness and
suspicion that accompanies complaints in the absence of a medi-
ator. As developers of monitoring institutions, mediators bring
legitimacy and independent pressure on the implementation of
the agreements reached.
Finally, mediators can help the parties design internal dis-
pute resolution techniques for overcoming impasses in the
peace process. In the 1994-95 talks, stumbling blocks were typi-
cally dealt with through increasingly threatening letters and ulti-
matums. No discussions took place, before or during the negoti-
ations, to consider how the parties should approach impasses. A
professional mediator at the very least can help the parties con-
sider different options for moving the dialogue forward. Such
options include a secret summit between more senior represent-
atives, direct contact between the leadership, or a delay in the
negotiations in which the parties are instructed to refine posi-
tions and to suggest alternatives. There are numerous ap-
proaches to handling impasses and a professional mediator can
guide the parties to explore options. Again, such a role by no
means ensures more productivity. It does, however, create a
more carefully and deliberately constructed process which in
turn makes it more difficult for the parties to resort to violence
once again.
B. Develop an Operating Framework
For peace talks to succeed, it is essential that they are struc-
tured around a mandate of common objectives. The attempt to
develop such a mandate will inform the parties early on if there
is enough general agreement to expect tenable peace negotia-
tions. Should such efforts fail to identify zones of agreement,
then full peace talks are not likely to be worthwhile and may in
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fact be counter-productive. Because such face-to-face peace talks
are rare and require the initiation of extraordinary develop-
ments, a missed opportunity could result in a degeneration of
communication and a further distancing between the parties.
This occurrence, unfortunately, has been the Sri Lankan experi-
ence. Exploratory talks and open exchanges are needed prior to
the official talks and ensuing public scrutiny to enable the par-
ties to reach broad zones of agreement before full peace negoti-
ations can take place.
Developing a mandate also forces the parties to talk about
the peace talks. Specifically, this means considering, developing,
and refining the process of the peace talks. The 1994-95 talks
were hampered by an ad hoc approach on both sides. Neither
party entered the peace talks with a detailed plan, and the pro-
cess of the talks reflected its hazy conception. The government
and the LTTE, for instance, had different understandings of the
general approach to the negotiations-the relation between eco-
nomic development and political discussion. This incongruence
remained throughout the peace process and seemed to contrib-
ute significantly to the breakdown of the talks. Creating an oper-
ating framework compels the parties to specify a systematic ap-
proach for negotiation. It makes the parties view the process it-
self as an important dimension of the negotiation. If a
framework were developed prior to the talks, the inherent diffi-
culties of pursuing reconstruction before political dialogue may
have become evident. Although negotiating the complex details
to a potential settlement will continue to form the crux of any
peace talks, and may very well be acrimonious, the establishment
of a setting of shared understandings of process can help to fo-
cus the energies of the parties on the difficult substantive issues.
Furthermore, the development of an operating framework
forces the parties to consider and to create an agenda. Once the
parties recognize broad objectives, establishing a schedule for
negotiating those objectives becomes necessary. Although few
negotiations occur exactly as they are planned, a general pro-
gram outlining what specific issues will be discussed, and when
they will be discussed, further contributes to a common under-
standing of the pace and progress of peace talks. The tension
over when political issues would be discussed was a central a fac-
tor in the breakdown of the talks. An explicit agenda could have
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helped the parties develop a shared overall sense of the pace of
the peace talks.
In addition, the process of building an operating framework
can be an opportune time to explore sensitive process-related
issues that can have harmful ramifications on the negotiation.
For instance, in an exploratory session, the LTTE could have
voiced its distress at the lack of senior officials on the govern-
ment's negotiating team. The government may have been will-
ing to accommodate the LTTE at an early juncture by including
more senior government officials. But because there was no in-
teraction before the first round of peace talks, there was less op-
portunity for the sides to directly express their concerns about
potentially damaging process-related issues. Again, such an ex-
ploratory session by no means insures fewer process-related ob-
stacles, but such an effort might at least create the opportunity
for process-oriented obstacles to be discussed and negotiated
early in the dialogue.
A third-party mediator can also play an instrumental role in
facilitating the development of an operating framework.
Whether active or passive, an experienced mediator assists par-
ties in recognizing a common approach to the process of the
talks, helps identify zones of possible agreement, and helps de-
velop a practical agenda. In the Sri Lankan context, an impar-
tial participant could have helped the parties clear up the confu-
sion of who would make the first offer in political discussions.
Instead, each side waited for the other to present a potential
political arrangement, resulting in disastrous consequences.
C. Communicate Through Non-Written Means and Establish a Hot-
line Option
Roger Fisher, in his seminal work on negotiations, Getting to
Yes, explains that improving both the relationship and the level
of communication between two parties in conflict dramatically
increases the prospects for arriving at a negotiated agreement. 197
The face-to-face dialogue between the government and the
LTTE, despite its flaws, created productive communication and
a peaceful relationship. The use of letters as a principal form of
communication, however, restricted communication and the re-
197. ROGERJ. FISHER, W. URY, & B. PATRON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING WITH-
ouT GIVING IN (1991).
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lationship in a way that alternative direct dialogue might have
avoided. As mentioned earlier, letters are a highly difficult and
ultimately an unsatisfactory method of communicating complex
ideas.19 While letters can be useful in some circumstances, es-
pecially to cool passions and to create space, the process of writ-
ing, as this author can attest, makes accurately expressing and
exchanging information very difficult. Because the issues in the
Sri Lankan conflict are so complicated, it seems unrealistic to
expect that letters could serve as an adequate medium for arriv-
ing at solutions. The fact that communicating through letters
takes a great deal of time in Sri Lanka further underscores the
constraints of written exchanges on developing a joint under-
standing on pressing issues. Oral discussions through in-person
negotiation and between senior level officials provide the most
direct and advantageous method of accurately communicating
the interests, options, and alternatives involved. Yet this method
was marginalized in the Sri Lankan peace process through the
development of a second tier of written communication.
The process of communicating through letters also im-
peded the growth of relationships between the negotiators and
the parties. The formality and brevity of a letter inhibit the
building of trust and respect between the two groups. Casual
conversations, open exchanges, and requests for further expla-
nation provide the negotiators with insights into substantive is-
sues and the commitment and professionalism of the opposing
negotiator and organization. Although the exchange of letters
was never meant to supplant in-person negotiations, the growing
importance of this form of communication throughout the
peace process directed emphasis away from oral discussions of
issues. The relationships between the negotiators and the par-
ties suffered as a result. Moreover, the use of letters provided
each side with publishable ammunition to attack and to accuse
the other of bad faith. This temptation proved too great to re-
sist, and again, the status of the relationship consequently suf-
fered. Discouraging the use of letters in favor of more compre-
hensive oral discussions could have positively impacted the Sri
Lankan peace process.
In addition to in-person, senior level negotiation, the gov-
ernment and the LTTE need to create regular, open lines of
198. Interview with Neelan Tiruchelvam, supra note 157.
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communication to provide an alternative process for continuing
the peace dialogue. A hot-line, for instance, between the leader-
ship of the LTTE and the government. can serve the same in-
tended purpose of letters-to jump-start stalled talks, to express
the importance of issues, and to appeal for appropriate action.
Although negotiations remain the more effective method of
communication and ought to be the focus of any peace process,
a hot-line can provide a second avenue for exchange and expla-
nation between the parties in urgent situations. While some
have suggested that infrastructure concerns prevented such a
possibility-the LTTE leadership, after all, is fortified deep
within the Vanni Jungle-the use of satellites or the assistance of
outside parties, such as India or Norway, could have provided
the necessary telecommunications support.199 The more troub-
ling obstacle may have been the psychological barrier for the
President of Sri Lanka to communicate directly with a "terrorist"
leader. Moreover, the government was afraid of legitimizing
Prabhakaran through such access to the President. Nonetheless,
a hot-line between the parties would have afforded a more re-
sponsive, back-up process for dialogue.
In the absence of political will to create a hot-line, a media-
tor could facilitate dialogue between Prabhakaran and
Kumaratunga if their representatives have reached a stalemate.
An impartial third-party mediator could serve as a messenger be-
tween the leaders and assist in framing the communications in
the most favorable light for advancing the peace process. In-
deed, even if a hot-line existed, the use of a mediator to under-
take "shuttle diplomacy" could provide an effective method for
exchanging information on highly sensitive issues. By drawing
on the advantages of oral communication, and through skillfully
shaping the tone of the dialogue, a mediator would provide a
better avenue for communication relative to the exchange of let-
ters.
D. Use Non-Public Dialogue
The type of exploratory talks that this Article advocates as a
precursor to actual peace talks may not be politically feasible or
desirable if held publicly. The political maneuvering between
the government and the LTTE, and the pressures on each to
199. Interview with Harry Goonethileke, supra note 5.
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claim victory for its respective constituency and to present
favorable national and international images seriously under-
mines the open, honest, and creative exchanges necessary for a
successful negotiation. In Sri Lanka, holding such public explor-
atory talks200 could irresponsibly generate deep expectations,
which, in turn, would make exploratory talks even more difficult
and guarded. To minimize such outside pressures and to avoid
creating unrealistic expectations, exploratory talks may be more
effective if held secretly.
Secret talks would allow greater flexibility for the parties.
For instance, outside the public eye, the parties are freer to sug-
gest creative arrangements and to build rapport through infor-
mal activities. During the Oslo Accords, the Norwegian
mediators were able to create a hidden environment in which no
topic was barred from discussion. The PLO and Israeli repre-
sentatives were able to recognize more common ground than
had previously been apparent.20 1 Without public pressures for
results, parties are more amenable to spending time discussing
and imagining scenarios that could in turn lead to break-
throughs in results. One of the chief process-oriented obstacles
to the 1994-95 peace talks was the limited time of actual negotia-
tion. Secret talks allow parties to spend days, weeks, even
months, to exchange, to refine, and to develop their interests,
options, and alternatives. Finally, the secrecy of talks minimizes
the need for protocol, which had a negative effect on the peace
talks. The attention to protocol in the 1994-95 talks created an
overly formal atmosphere and provided the Sinhalese media
with symbols, such as a Tamil flag, for condemning the peace
process. Similarly, secret dialogue limits the need for the use of
letters, which provide the parties with public relations ammuni-
tion to the detriment of the peace process. In non-public ex-
ploratory talks, lengthy oral discussion is the primary means of
developing a common operating framework.
Nevertheless, secret talks are in some sense risky. The gov-
ernment has feared that secret talks would be exposed and that
such talks would exemplify the government's weakness in deal-
ing with the "terrorist threat" to unpopular response in the
200. By "public" the author is referring to the non-secret nature of the peace pro-
cess. Of course the actual negotiations were conducted without any public admittance.
201. CORBIN, supra note 175.
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Sinhalese heartland. During the talks, Kumaratunga repeatedly
assured the Sri Lankan people that there were no parallel secret
talks.202 This fear, however, may be overstated. If the talks are
conceived in a way that allows deniability, the fear of discovery
might not be prohibitive. London or Paris, cities in which both
parties staff senior officials, could serve as locations for such se-
cret talks, especially if assisted by a sympathetic host government.
Four years of secret negotiations between South Africa's Na-
tional Party and the ANC suggests that if the two parties are
highly organized and keep information limited to a few players,
discovery is difficult. 203 Although man), high-profile representa-
tives took part in the Oslo Accords, sophisticated intelligence
agencies and journalists remained unaware of these proceed-
ings. With the requisite political will, secret exploratory talks
would help to provide an accommodating environment for cre-
ating the crucial operating framework necessary for the negotia-
tions.
Another advantage of secret talks is that they do not require
a cease-fire as a precursor to negotiations. By insisting on peace
before discussions of political issues, the government and the
LTTE may have inadvertently created pressures on themselves
that ultimately proved unsustainable. When the talks were not
advancing as the LTTE desired, the temptation and ability to
break the cease-fire and thereby end the talks became very real.
The LTTE may, in fact, have feared the consequences of letting
its cadres remain idle for too long. Secret talks help to avoid
these pressures by approaching the issue of a cease-fire after dif-
ficult political issues are negotiated. In this way, negotiations
can continue indefinitely and are not controlled by military ma-
neuvers. Although military actions and political rhetoric may fill
the public dialogue, in secret talks, negotiators are free to con-
tinue to build relationships and to improve communication.
Third-party mediators could help establish secret talks. Dis-
cussions between senior officials of the LTTE and the govern-
ment are unlikely within Sri Lanka due to security issues and the
greater risk of detection. Foreign cities, however, could serve as
a base for talks, and a sympathetic host government could pro-
202. DAiLY NEws (Sri Lanka), Mar. 4, 1997 (stating that "[t] here will be no secret
deals of any kind with the LTTE.").
203. SPARKS, supra note 171, at 21, 37.
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vide the necessary security. England, France, Norway, and
others have expressed interest in supporting peace efforts, so the
problem is not a lack of suitable mediators.
It should be noted that any third-party intervention would
likely need the approval of India. The geo-political realities of
the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka implicate India as a continuing
player in events in its region of influence. Although relations
between India and the LTTE leadership have been strained
since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, partly because of India's
request for the extradition of Prabhakaran, India would likely
insist on playing at least a supervisory role in any foreign media-
tion of the Sri Lankan conflict.
E. Improve Internal Procedures: Time, Informality, Creativity,
and Preparation
Some relatively simple revisions to the procedures of the
1994-95 peace talks could help improve the likelihood of success
of future negotiations. For instance, the negotiations ought to
be longer. The 1994-95 talks were extraordinarily short. Each
round typically consisted of one day, and that day usually con-
sisted of five hours of discussions. In comparison with the hun-
dreds of hours of negotiations in resolving many ethnic conflicts,
such as the Middle East peace process and negotiations in South
Africa, the Sri Lanka negotiations were distressingly brief. Both
parties should consider establishing procedures for longer stays
and for longer hours of negotiations to improve the ability of the
parties to clarify issues, to explain interests, to exchange options,
and to consider alternatives. Such tasks are time consuming
when thoroughly undertaken.
Longer negotiations would likely have a positive effect on
building trust between the parties. Even a cursory study of Sri
Lankan history reveals a deep level of mistrust between Tamil
and Sinhalese leaders. The infrequency and brevity of the nego-
tiations made building personal relationships based on trust and
respect more difficult. The less time negotiators have to get to
know each other, the less opportunity there is for advancing per-
sonal relationships. Perhaps more importantly, the negotiations
ought to include some informal dimension to create the envi-
ronment necessary to advance the relationship of the parties.
Opportunities for informal discussions often lead to break-
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throughs in difficult negotiations.2"4 Professional mediators are
quick to acknowledge that informal activities, such as shared
meals, receptions, etc., provide a freer atmosphere for people to
explore possibilities and for enemies to connect as people. In
the Sri Lankan context, there was virtually no informal dimen-
sion to the peace talks.
To build trust, more explicit trust-building steps can be uti-
lized. The government and the LTTE made important maneu-
vers in the beginning of their dialogue to release prisoners as a
sign of good faith. Such moves were warmly received by both
sides and helped to develop a spirit of cooperation that is a nec-
essary part of any peace talks. There was little systematic effort,
however, to include trust-building steps as a technique for ad-
vancing the spirit of cooperation. Inexpensive trades orjoint ac-
tion, even if only of symbolic value, can help to advance the mo-
mentum of peace talks. Implementable trust-building steps that
place a burden on the LTTE could further evidence the LTTE's
commitment to the peace process and help to elevate their repu-
tation and their parity with the Sri Lankan government.
Developing creative trades orjoint action can be more read-
ily accomplished if the parties designate greater time in the ne-
gotiations for brainstorming. The technique of brainstorming-
suggesting and considering possible options and arrangements
in a non-binding format-was absent from the 1994-95 talks.
Although brainstorming can only be as successful as the ideas
proffered by the participants, brainstorming helps to inject crea-
tivity into traditional positional bargaining and hardball tactics.
The more creative the exchange of ideas, the more opportunity
for identifying efficient trades and for creating value for both
parties.
Issues of preparation are also important to discuss here be-
cause they partially explain the construction of the talks. The
lack of preparation, the lack of support staff, and the failure to
develop mandates, techniques and deliberative procedures, re-
sulted in a poorly designed negotiation. To arrive at a more pro-
fessionally structured negotiation and to develop more coherent
strategies for solving the substantive issues of controversy, both
204. The breakthrough accomplished between Ecuadorian and Peruvian negotia-
tors occurred during a birthday reception outside the formal negotiation process.
Weidner, supra note 136.
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sides need to understand more fully their interests, options, and
alternatives. 2 5 The development of a Ministry of Negotiation
with a support staff of professional negotiators to explore poten-
tial frameworks and political arrangements would likely em-
power the negotiators with greater mobility to arrive at common
ground. The LTTE and the government need to prepare for the
negotiations as seriously as they prepare for war.
The inclusion of a third-party mediator could help to create
more effective internal procedures for peace talks. A third-party
mediator could suggest longer, more frequent negotiations, as
well as host informal events. Experienced mediators could also
provide insights and impetus to enacting brainstorming sessions
or other methods for bringing more creativity into the peace
process. Finally, a mediator could assist in the preparation by
assigning "homework" to the parties to explore issues further, to
develop options, and to compel the parties to consider the im-
portance of process-related issues. By helping the parties to
identify underlying tensions that are creating barriers to the res-
olution of the conflict, and by encouraging the sides to explore
and to explain such tensions further, a mediator could help to
create paths around stumbling blocks. In the Sri Lankan con-
text, such assistance and encouragement is long overdue.
F. Develop Intra-Party Cohesion
Creating a peaceful settlement to the ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka is a difficult and complex endeavor. When a party exper-
iences internal fragmentation, tensions, and conflicts, develop-
ing a peaceful settlement becomes even more tenuous. Without
intra-party cohesion, a party is either too weak to undertake the
necessary steps for peace or perceived as too weak to deliver on
its end of the bargain. Implementation problems can quickly
sour a budding relationship. If the Sri Lankan peace process is
to move forward, the government needs to improve its relations
205. When one considers the amount of money, personnel, and equipment that is
invested in solving the conflict through military victory, it seems surprising that such
little investment and personnel were infused into the negotiation process. If a cabinet
level ministry is politically too difficult to create, at least bureaus of negotiation need to
be formed to develop the approaches, research issues, conceive strategies, and coordi-
nate implementation to advance the dialogue and the process of peace. When the
government and the LT[E create such institutions, their commitment to a peaceful
settlement will be more credible.
SRI LANKAN PEACE TALKS
with the opposition parties, the military, and the Sinhalese pub-
lic.
The historical competition between the UNP and SLFP to
capture the nationalist vote and its disastrous effect on efforts to
forge common ground with Tamil leaders is not altogether in-
consistent with today's competitions between the UNP and PA to
speak for the Sinhalese mainstream. When the PA makes over-
tures of peace, such as relaxing the economic embargo, the ef-
fort is laced with guarded precautions so that they do not seem
too peace-minded. Although the PA won the election on a peace
platform, there is a palpable fear in Colombo of moving too fast
and of creating an impression of "giving in" or being "weak."
This intra-party rivalry and its detrimental effect on the peace
process has not gone unnoticed. The former British Under Sec-
retary for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs, Dr. Liam Fox,
brokered an agreement in 1997 between the PA and UNP onthis very issue. 206 The agreement calls for the PA to consult the
UNP on issues relating to the resolution of the ethnic conflict.
The effect of this agreement is unclear. Although the agree-
ment provided a hopeful sign, the latest government action to
ban the LTTE was taken without consulting the UNP. This ac-
tion, in turn, sparked deep resentment and further division over
how to approach the peace process. As long as the UNP and PA
remain so divided on central issues of the peace process, success-
ful negotiations with the LTTE are unlikely.
The importance of secret negotiations as an avenue for de-
veloping a framework for peace talks makes the cooperation and
trust between the UNP and PA even more important. Ap-
proaches to peace that wholly exclude the opposition will not
only violate the Fox Agreement, but could impede broad-based
Sinhalese support, which is so necessary for important peace de-
velopments. Yet, to create such extensive support and to include
the opposition, the PA needs to trust that the opposition will not
use inside information for its own advancement in the polls. Ef-
forts to create common ground between the leadership of the
UNP and the PA on the ethnic question would improve the
chances for successful peace talks.
206. Rediff on the Net, Landmark Peace Initiative in Lanka (visited Jan. 4, 1998)
<http://www.rediff.co.in/news/apr/031anka.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
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Increased government effort to involve the Buddhist clergy
and the military, the two most stringent defenders of Sinhalese
nationalism, into the peace process seems likely to advance the
peace dialogue. Although much of the Buddhist clergy is unwill-
ing to consider "concessions" to the LTTE, efforts to promote
more moderate religious voices could support peace efforts.
More importantly, the government needs to exercise greater
control over the military. If forces within the military can frus-
trate peace efforts, such as the effort to lift the embargo, then
the government's authority to negotiate a settlement will be seri-
ously undermined. Efforts to integrate the military more fully
into the peace process will be difficult. The hidden economies
of the conflict and varying interests of commanding officers are
difficult obstacles to overcome. Moreover, General Ratwatte
seems thoroughly content to solve the ethnic problem militarily.
Nonetheless, greater effort to control and to integrate the mili-
tary can advance the peace process by empowering the govern-
ment with greater credibility.
The government should also help prepare the public for
peace through public education campaigns. There is a deep, so-
cial psychological divide between Sinhalese and Tamil communi-
ties, leading some scholars to assert that the parties inhabit "di-
vergent realities."2 °7  The Sinhalese mainstream, informed
mostly by a vehemently anti-Tamil press, has developed an antip-
athy and suspicion of the LTTE that needs to be overcome. For-
mer U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Teresita Schaffer, refers to
this needed dimension as "constituency building."2 °8 The gov-
ernment needs to create both grassroots and top-down mecha-
nisms for educating the public on the benefits, risks, and costs of
the peace process. If the government fails to prepare the public
for peace and fails to develop a more inclusive constituency that
favors peace, it is unlikely that the momentum for peace talks
can be sustained.
The LTTE as a strict guerrilla organization does not suffer
from the same intra-party conflicts as the government. There
are, however, divergent voices within the Tamil community.
207. Interview with Dr. Donna Hicks, Deputy Director, Program on International
Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR), Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (Jan.
6, 1998).
208. Telephone Interview with Teresita Schaffer, supra note 143.
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Most Tamil parties favor a devolution of power rather than a
separate Tamil homeland, and competition between these Tamil
parties does affect, if only modestly, the progress of peace.
Tamil parties with links to the Sri Lankan government are fear-
ful that concessions to the more extreme LTTE will lead to its
undemocratic domination of the Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces.2 °9 The LTTE remains committed to providing results for
the Tamil community that would have been unattainable
through peaceful means-justifying its armed resistance and the
ensuing suffering of the Tamil people. Although the intra-Tamil
rivalries do not create the foremost obstacles to peace, the com-
petition between divergent Tamil movements creates an addi-
tional barrier in the peace process. Unfortunately, there seems
to be little motivation on the part of the LTTE or other Tamil
parties to improve their relationships.
Again, a mediator can play a useful role in developing intra-
party cohesion. In the preparatory stages, a mediator can en-
courage and facilitate exchanges between the PA and UNP. In
fact, a mediator could serve as a "repository of trust"210 for devel-
oping dialogue on a coherent approach to peace. On the Tamil
side, a trusted mediator could serve as an interlocutor among
Tamil parties that have no official relationship with the LTTE.
Whether such a service will be utilized is unclear. The point is
simply that a mediator could empower the parties with more op-
tions and avenues to develop intra-party cohesion.
CONCLUSION
One of the most surprising elements of the 1994-95 peace
talks is that the breakdown of the talks occurred despite the fact
that the parties were not very far apart on the main substantive
issues that they discussed. There was movement and concession
on the issue of the Pooneryn Camp, and action had been taken
to improve the implementation of the lifting of the embargo.
Yet these issues still became deal-breakers for both sides. The
fact that the Army camp at Pooneryn was voluntarily abandoned
following a successful LTTE attack on an Army camp at Mullitivo
suggests that there may have been more going on at the 1994-95
peace talks than meets the eye. That is, both sides may not have
209. Interview with Neelan Tiruchelvam, supra note 157.
210. Interview with Dr. Donna Hicks, supra note 207.
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been ready for peace. The LTTE's refusal to discuss political
issues and its early withdrawal from the peace talks, the govern-
ment's failures of implementation and commitment to a secon-
dary solution in its devolution package, and the deeply flawed
process of the 1994-95 talks, raises the suspicion that peace was
purposefully unlikely. At the very least, the failure of the parties
to create a constructive process for peace hindered good faith
efforts.
Currently, the peace process is virtually non-existent. The
war rages in the North, with General Ratwatte pursuing an open-
ended mandate to crush the LTTE once and for all. The gov-
ernment has officially banned the LTTE and thus outlawed com-
munication with them. Intra-party rivalries within the govern-
ment have reached even greater heights following this deci-
sion.2 11 Internationally, the LTTE has become a pariah, banned
in both the United States and Canada, due to the LTTE's terror-
istic bombing campaign.212 Even Sri Lanka's foremost peace ac-
tivists, like Dr. Uyangoda, are beginning to consider that a
peaceful end to the ethnic conflict that preserves a unified Sri
Lanka, may, after two decades of effort, be unattainable.213
There are, however, modest signals that suggest that peace
and reconciliation are possible between the Tamil and Sinhalese
communities and leadership. The absence of race riots follow-
ing the bombing of the Temple of the Tooth, for instance, indi-
cates that a resort to mob violence as a medium for ethnic pas-
sion is not tolerated under the PA government. President
Kumaratunga's decision to present her Independence Day
speech in English rather than Sinhala can be seen as a sincere
attempt to downplay race pride in favor of forging reconciliation
with Tamil communities. 214 The devolution package itself, while
marginalizing the LTTE, at least reflects a thoughtful commit-
ment to improving the plight of Tamil people in Sri Lanka.
Despite the territorial success of the Sri Lankan Army over
211. P.S. Suryanarayana, Sri Lanka UNP-PA Row Threatens Peace Process, THE HINDU,
Mar. 5, 1995.
212. LTTE- A Foreign Terrorist Organization, SRI LANKA NEWS (Embassy of Sri Lanka,
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1997, at 1. The designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organi-
zation by the U.S. State Department has been challenged in U.S. district court. Tele-
phone Interview with Mr. V. Rudrakumar, LTTE U.S. Representative, (Jan. 5, 1998).
213. Interview with Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda, supra note 108.
214. Feizal Samath, Sri Lanka: Kumaratunga Walks the Risky Language Tight-Rope,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 2, 1998.
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the past three years, it is unlikely that the LTTE will be fully de-
feated. Holding and controlling the newly-acquired territory, ac-
cording to former Air-Vice Marshall Harry Goonethileke, will be
difficult and costly for the Sri Lankan armed forces." 5 The
LTTE continues to have access to resources and to committed
young fighters, and will therefore continue to undermine terri-
torial gains by the Sri Lankan armed forces, and to destabilize
life in the South through suicide bombings. The need for nego-
tiations and third-party mediation has not diminished since the
end of the 1994-95 peace talks.
Perhaps the most urgent development needed is the rees-
tablishment of open and regular lines of communication be-
tween the government and the LTTE. Such a move would re-
quire the government to retract its ban on the LTTE, at least
where communication is concerned. Without an avenue to ex-
plore possible alternatives to war and possible frameworks for
future talks, both sides are wedded to full-scale military engage-
ment. While this Article has argued that secret negotiations are
the most likely avenue for developing a framework for future
peace talks, some form of communication is better than none. If
the process of communicating is severed, so are realistic hopes
for peace.
Building and repairing the relationships between Tamil and
Sinhalese leaders will be crucial to any future success in the
peace dialogue. The deep mistrust permeating LTTE and gov-
ernment relations may only be overcome through third-party
mediation. Although the LTTE remains receptive to this idea,216
the government has openly favored a military campaign and
therefore rejects any third-party intervention. War weariness
may change this dynamic over the next few years.
In the end, the 1994-95 Sri Lankan peace talks provide in-
sights into how errors of process impeded the peace negotiations.
The recommendations suggested in this Article provide alterna-
tives for structuring peace talks should they occur in the future.
The argument, however, is not that all of these recommenda-
tions need to be enacted for talks to be successful. Taken indi-
vidually, no single process-oriented obstacle of the 1994-95
215. Interview with Harry Goonethileke, supra note 5.
216. Sri Lanka's LTTE Seeks 3rd-Party Mediation for Talks, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Mar. 30, 1997.
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peace process marks an insurmountable barrier to peace.
Rather, with greater emphasis on, and with further considera-
tion and analysis of the process and procedure of peace talks,
the government and the LTTE will likely provide themselves a
better opportunity to end the civil war and to create the instru-
ments and institutions necessary to maintain a lasting resolution
to the conflict.
